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*fo'->7 PREFACE
It Is a generally accepted fact by most historians that not much
has been written about African history, particularly on an isolated
topic like the "Groundnuts Scheme" which Is the subject of this paper.
The paper represents an effort to supplement what has already been
covered in the realm of history of this vast and growing continent.
Furthermore, the paper has been written as a part of both East
African and British history since both communities played a part in
the project. As such, it is hoped that it will be of interest to both
the African and the English student of history.
While the author has sought to present the main objectives of the
Scheme, he has also included comprehensive surveys of its progress,
inherent problems and their possible solutions, Its contributions and
effects on African people and its political repurcussions on the British
Labour Government as its sponsor.
A special debt of gratitude is due to a number of persons. First,
the author is grateful to Dr. Robin Higham, Associate Professor of History
at Kansas State University, whose advice led to the selection of this
topic. He also offered useful directions in conducting research, read
half of the scripts and offered very useful suggestions. Second, many
thanks go to Dr. Joseph Gallanar, Assistant Professor of History also
at Kansas State University. He became the major advisor after Dr. Higham
left for vacation. His persistent help led to the accomplishment of this
piece of work. Third, the author is indebted to Miss Lois Turner, also
Assistant Professor of History at Kansas State University, for reading
iii
the scripts and giving very useful suggestions relating to sentence
structure, choice of words and correct spelling. Fourth, are Miss Eilleen
Roberts and Mrs. Taylor, both members of the reference department of the
K.S.U. library. The author had almost given up the topic until Miss
Roberts provided the avenue for sources. She tirelessly assisted in
finding more sources throughout the entire process. Her encouragement
and ideas after reading a part of the scripts are also appreciated.
For Mrs. Taylor, the author is grateful for her effort of obtaining some
of the important materials on interlibrary loan system.
Finally for friends, much gratitude is due to Miss Janice McKelvy,
graduate student in education at Kansas State University for being the
first to read Chapters IV, V, and VI, and offering assistance in sentence
construction and spelling.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
Introduction
"The British Groundnut Scheme" was a project designed to grow
rapidly the large-scale, mechanized productions of groundnuts (peanuts)
in East Africa. It became a matter of public concern on March 28, I9I46.
But its origins go back to well before the Second World War; examination
of some factors which dominated the thinking of the leading figures in
Britain is necessary. These factors had a very close bearing on the
subject. In addition to the wartime scarcity of oils and fats, two
other factors must be noted: the change in the British Colonial policy
and the idea of colonial development and welfare.
The New British Colonial Policy and
Colonial Development and Welfare
After the loss of the American colonies in 1783, a more flexible
colonial policy emerged. It was based on the principle that the maximum
of initiative and responsibility both politically and economically should
rest with the colonial administration. This meant the British government
proceeded so that the colonies would eventually be able to provide for
their own public and social services directly from their own revenue
and indirectly from private corporations through sound, stable governments
Tlelville J. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Chang ing Africa
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 219.
2of their own. In 1921, the British government started a program through
which the Development and Welfare in the Empire would be handled. In
1929, the first Colonial Development Act was passed. This was:
...to authorize the making of advances for aiding and
developing agriculture and industry in certain colonies and
territories, to provide the extension of the colonial stock
acts of 1877 and 1900, to stock forming part of the public
debt of certain protected and mandated territories and to
amend the Palestine and East African Loans Act of 1926 and
section eleven of the Trust Act of 1921.2
Different sections of the act dealt with different colonial areas
j
however, the esse nee of the act was to make available £ 1,000,000 annually
to meet the expenses of both the agricultural and the industrial establish-
ments in the colonies. New projects such as research, education, health
and other social services made the sum inadequate. As a consequence,
a related act—"The Colonial Development and VileIfare Act of 19h0"3 was
passed. This act increased the annual appropriation to E 5,000,000
for the next decade. It provided opportunity for promoting the develop-
ment of the resources of the colonies, protectorates and the welfare of
the peoples. It was also designed to relieve the Colonial and other
governments from Inability in respect of certain loans.'4
2
"Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 19l*5 (8 and 9 Geo. 6, Ch. ,20):
Description and Purpose, together with an extract from a speech by the
Secretary of State for the colonies, the Right Hon. Oliver Stanley, intro-
ducing the Bill in the House of Commons, 7 February 19li5," in Nicholas
Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs
1931-1952 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. II, p. 1073.
•5
^British Information Service (ed.), Economic Development in the
British Colonies (New York: British Information Service, June 19U9),
p. 5. (Hereafter cited as Economic Development )
h
Mansergh, op_. cit ., Vol. II, p. 1075.-
3Five years later the same act required amendment. A bill, introduced
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Right Hon. Qlver Stanley,
?
increased the amount provided by the Act of 19h0 to £ 120,000,000. Minor
amendments included the continuation of certain programs. The distribution
of this large sum was as follows: "Individual territories and groups of
territories— £ 3^,000,000; centrally-administered schemes such as research,
education and surveys—£ 25,000,000; supplementary—£ 11,000,000."
With these funds now on hand, the colonial governments began drawing
up ten-year plans which would enable them to develop and increase their
n independent financial stability and orovide adequate social services
for their people. These plans, of course, had to meet the approval of
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the chief executive on colonial
affairs.
A chain of bills was making steady progress and getting sufficient
support from government circles as well a? from the public. The sponsors
argued that the bills, particularly that of 1929, were designed not only
to assist the dependencies but also to relieve Britain's unemployment
problem. The 19^0 bill demonstrated how ambitious the government Yfas.
The critics of the bill (of 19^0 ) argued that it was useless to pass such
t
Oliver Stanley was the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the
Coalition government of Churchill. Since he was responsible for intro-
ducing the bill, it follows that the V)k& Act was the work of the Coali-
tion government. The Labour Party taking over later in that year (19k5)
simply expanded by effecting numerous revolutionary socialist programs
—
nationalization, welfare state programs like social insurance, National
Health service—at home, and Groundnuts Scheme, Gambian Egg Production,
The Owen Fa Lis Scheme—in the colonies.
Economic Development ^ loc . cit .
ha bill cause it would not be effected since the government was engaged
in war. This did not appear true. In fact, just before the war ended,
it was expanded by the passing of the 19h$ bill.'
The trend of these acts was to establish a line of thought which
culminated in the 19i|8 measure which created the Overseas Food Corporation
(O.F.C.). This organization took over the responsibilities for the
Groundnut Scheme, and extension of the entire Colonial Development and
WeIfare Program
.
°
These far reaching programs led to various sophisticated schemes
which demanded more financial support; therefore, the colonial governments
were obliged to raise money locally, either from reserves or through loans.
In addition, sound and careful management was needed. The programs were
later coordinated into about forty plans which were carried on in nearly
all colonial territories, large and small. Economic and social programs
—
public health, education, housing, communication, campaigns against soil
erosion, tropical and other diseases, and prospecting for minerals re-
ceived attention.
9
Reasons for the Groundnut Scheme
Some of the fundamental questions to be asked are: Why was the
idea of growing groundnuts on a large-scale basis conceived? Why was
'Anon. "Development of Colonial Re sources j The African Groundnut
Scheme," World Today, Vol. IV (March 19)48), p. 103.
Q
The provisions and the work of the Corporation will be treated in
detail under a separate section in this paper.-
9World Today , oj>. cit., Vol. IV, p. lOlu
$the British government so ambitious and so optimistic about it? Why-
was tropical Africa selected as the most convenient area of operation?
Though most sources emphasize the economic and social, there are political
and climatic reasons as well. They must now be examined carefully, one
by one, in terms of their relevance to the East African Groundnut Scheme.
Coming back to the question, "Why was the idea of growing groundnuts
on a large-scale basis conceived?" a part of the answer is found in the
British economic situation. The time between the two wars (1918-1939)
was a period of great depression and it was quite clear that Britain
would not make sufficient recovery while fighting the Second World War*
the after effects of which created, despite victory, various domestic
problems. 10 One left-over from the war was the shortage of oils, fats
and other foodstuffs. This was quite acute as compared with that of
other foodstuffs, and production was relatively low. Before the war,
Britain had imported most of her oils and fats from Asian countries,
particularly India, but after the war this was no longer possible for
three major reasons: "(1) Political development in India, (2) Population
growth in India and (3) The events of the war in the East Indies."^
India was in the last stage of her struggle for independence
achieved in 19li7. This meant that all the responsibilities, political
as well as economic, had to be handed over to the independent government
of India, thus changing the whole structure of control of commerce and
10
Anon. "East African Groundnuts Plan: The First Stage," Crown
Colonist
,
Vol. XVII (May 19h7), p. 2$3.
A. H. Bunting, "Land Development and Large Scale Food Production
in East Africa by Overseas Food Corporation," Economic Botany , Vol. VI
(Jan. - Mar. 1962), p. 55.
6trade. It was now up to the Indian government to decide what to do with
its agricultural products, and the demands of its own increasing popu-
lation came first. Thus, the amount Britain was used to getting was
drastically reduced. Finally, the war in the East Indies had effected
the regular Indian supply to Britain because a considerable portion had
to be sent to the East Indies to feed the soldiers there. With India
so close it was the only appropriate source of supply to reduce the cost
of transportation—which would have been much higher if the United States
or Canada had been the suppliers.
Along with the food scarcity in general, there was also a financial
deficit. At this time, the oils and fats were being produced in dollar
countries, particularly the United States and Canada. Britain did not
have the money to enable her to turn to these countries as new sources
of supply. She had very little money to spend, hence she curtailed her
buying. These two factors had great economic repercussions on Britain,
especially upon her farmers whose home products were heavily supplemented
with this foreign supply.^
Economically important also was the assistance the Groundnut Scheme
was going to provide to the whole world and to Africa in particular.
The world oil and fat supply was seriously reduced by high consumption
in war. Britain thought that by undertaking this adventurous enterprise
she could not only relieve herself but the whole world of the shortage.
12
A. Akers, "African Peanut Project," Foreign Agriculture
,
Vol. XIII
(May 191+9), p. 111.
7The world population was estimated to be increasing at the rate of fifteen
to twenty million per year which would exceed the death rates. This meant
that there would be an additional 1^0 million people after the var.^
The Scheme was to provide vast assistance to the African people.
To understand this, it is first necessary to look into the agricultural
situation in the British African colonies. It was primitive in nature,
operated by ill-fed peasants who tilled their land with primitive tools.
They had no concept of using any kind of fertilizers but were sensitive
only t<\ following their land and burning the bushes; as a result of which
poverty was common. The British government thought the remedy was to
teach sound farming methods to increase individual output. Many edu-
cational and medical services were also needed to help ease the misery,
poverty and starvation. A Scheme based on sound farming methods would
be an example to the African poeple of how to use their land. Many other
resources would also be developed by expanding communication facilities
and supplying more food for local consumption thereby relieving the pres-
sure on the land. 1^
Critics of the Scheme expressed pessimistic views. They pointed
out that despite the fact that the financial assistance provided was
considerable, it was inadequate to solve the problems of poverty in the
colonies. This could only be achieved, they argued, by:
^F. n # Howes, "Groundnuts (Africa)," Great Britain Ministry of
Agriculture Journal , Vol. LV (April 19h&), p. 25.
-^B. F. Richardson, Jr., "Britain's Groundnut Scheme in East
Africa," Journal of Geography
,
Vol. L (April 19$1), p. 1^0.
...large-scale capital investment, the opening up of vast
regions of unproductive land, and the application of modern
methods of mechanical agriculture j any project of this kind
involves such enormous capital expenditure and would take so
long to become a paying concern as to be unattractive to pri-
vate enterprise, quite apart from any objections to putting
large regions of colonial land under private control. ^©Y-
can only be undertaken by some form of public corporation. -*-5
Furthermore, not only Britan had the amibition to improve the East African
economy, but internally, the East African territories themselves had
illustrated the ambition to increase their wealth. The idea was apparent
when there were signs that the war had begun to turn in favor of Britain.
Various proposals for reconstruction and expansion were drafted. On
August 1, \9\j&, for example, a Development and Reconstruction Authority
was appointed in Kenya to enable the government to handle more effectively
the post war planning. A Development and Reconstruction Fund was also
set up in I9I46 for the purpose of accumulating capital for development.
Each country devised programs of its own as a foundation for recovery
since there was a great need to make up for the time lost during the
war. Involved too, was the repairing of so much that had been left to
crumble during the war years. There was another problem that was thought
to be overwhelming—the resettlement of the ex-servicemen. These men
had fought side by side with the British soldiers not only to defend
East Africa from the Italian aggression, but in the Far East where British
colonies like Malaya, Burma, India
—
just to name a few—were in danger
of Japanese attack. Both the British and the East African governments
were greatly concerned about these men. The Scheme, therefore, would also
-" jorld Today, loc . cit.
9be viewed as a government spending program to provide employment. Started
along with it for similar purpose was the Owen Falls electricity project
in Uganda. It was very successful and is a big economic asset to the
whole of East Africa now.
The economic situation in the British colonies in Africa has improved
greatly since then but not because of the Scheme. In this connection,
the critics were right in their predictions because financial under-
estimations were realized later and the Scheme failed completely, as
shall be shown later. Again, it was because of the critics' insistence
that the Scheme became the first government experiment despite the fact
that the idea was initiated and planned by a private corporation. Just
as the first Colonial Development Act was a government venture, so was
the East African Groundnut Scheme, designed primarily to relieve Britain
of some of her problems.
There were political as well as economic and social reasons for
undertaking this extensive program. The Labour Party had in 19^5 just
defeated the Conservative Party in the election. It had to undertake
venturesome programs to win confidence not only at home but in the colonies
as well. Finally, and perhaps of minor importance, was the climatic reason,
Supported by his knowledge and experience in Africa, Frank Samuel, Managing
Director of the United Africa Company, went to see the Minister of Food
and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. ^° He suggested that East
British Information Service (ed.), From Darkness to Light
(New York: British Information Service, Dec. 19h9)j p. 10. Hereafter
cited as From Darkness to Light
.
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Africa
—
-Kenya, Tanganyika and part of Northern Rhodesia—was suitable
for the operation in terms of temperature and rainfall, geographical
position, vegetation, soil types and health conditions. (For position
of East Africa, see map following.)
The Wakefield Mission and Its Report
The Ministers of Food and of the Colonies viewed the suggestion as
feasible and authorized an immediate investigation. A government team
consisting of A. J, Wakefield, formerly Director of Agriculture in
Tanganyika Territory, J. N. Rosa of the Colonial office, and D. L. Martin,
Head of the Plantations Department of the United African Company, was
dispatched to East Africa on June 20, 19li6. By September 20, the team
submitted a comprehensive report to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies . I? After studying this, the Minister of Food informed the
House of Commons of the government's decision to embark on the project
early in 19li7. Prior to the government's action, the United Africa
Company had made some progress in running the enterprise in 19)46.
The government's decision was printed in the "White Paper" entitled
A Plan for the Mechanized Production of Groundnuts in East and Central
Africa
.
3
-
8
The essence of the plan was: to clear about 107 units of bushes
inhabited with tset seflies, plough it and turn it into agricultural land
17World Today, op_. cit., Vol. IV, p. 10$.
-1 Q
x Herbert S. Frankel, The Economic Impact on Underdeveloped
Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp.' liil-li|2.
Tropic of \ Capricorn
1. Kenya was a British colony.
2. Tanganyika was a British
rusteeship Territory.
3. Northern Rhodesia was a
British Protectorate,
Groundnut areas
Location of the Three Selected Territories^
^Harold Fullard, Philip »s School Atlas ( East Africa ) (London:
George Philip and Son Ltd., 1959), p. 9.
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for the growth of groundnuts and grass. Mechanized methods would be
employed. Heavy equipment suitable to level and remove the bush would
be needed. Harvesting machines capable of lifting the groundnuts by
applying the methods already successful in the United States would be
used. One unit would be 30,000 acres. Sufficient numbers of labourers
would be needed for clearing purposes, about 300 Africans would be
needed to work one unit, and about 7^0 Europeans should be employed for
the whole scheme. The centers of operations would be in Tanganyika
Territory where the land was plentiful but gave habitation to tsetseflies
which are dangerous to human beings. At the start, eighty units would be
opened in Tanganyika, seventeen in Northern Rhodesia and ten in Kenya. ^0
Impracticability of the Estimates
The original plan in the "White Paper" estimated that the initial
yield would be 850 pounds of groundnuts per acre; this would rise to
1,120 pounds after the soil had been properly fertilized. The goal was
to have roughly 50,000 tons by 1950 and perhaps 300,000 tons by 1951.
These estimates were based on the current shortage, which ranged from
one and one-fourth to one and one-half million tons. They also depended
upon the availability of sufficient equipment. Finally, it was esti-
mated that production would cost roughly £ llj ^6d per ton of shelled
nuts. 21 in making these estimates, one important factor—the cost of
20
cforld Today j loc . cit .
21
The sources available did not indicate the market price by then.
13
transportation—was overlooked. The regions in which the scheme was to
be started were in the interior of the continent. Because of the topo-
. ra^hy, success would be difficult.
Africa is a relatively high continent surrounded by a narrow coastal
plain separted from the rest of the high plateau by a steep escarpment.
There are high mountains and deep valleys making railway and road con-
struction expensive. Rivers have their sources on the high plateau and
run swiftly down to the sea. A series of falls and cataracts make them
unnavigable. Rain in most parts is heavy, making roads and railways
impassable. These ft;cts together with lack of training of the native
people made the estimates completely inaccurate despite their scrutiny
and acceptance by the experts.
The operations ran far behind schedule because more time, workers
and equipment were required than had been estimated. The O.F.C. felt
the original estimates were useless and requested a revision early in
19h8—a request that was sustained and the O.F.C. announced a new plan
(./hite Paper, Cmd 8125) in 19$0. 22 The fact that the costs would be
greater than estimated did not come by surprise. Early in 19^3, the
general feeling was that the costs were likely to rise a great deal
more. This was the comment in The London Times before the O.F.C. realized
how impossible it was going to be to operate under the original plan. 23
22J.F.R. Hill, and J. P. L'offet, Tanganyika - A Review of Its
Resources and their Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Government of
Tanganyika, 19$$), p. 93.
-'The
/
London
)
Times , February 13, 19U8.
11*
The Initial Stages of the Scheme Under
the United Africa Company
The Scheme was going to be a government-operated one. But by the
end of 19l|6, nine months after the suggestion had been made to them, there
was no government corporation ready to undertake the project. Therefore,
a private corporation had to do so. The only one willing was the United
Africa Company whose managing director had initiated the idea. In
December, I9I46, the Company, acting as an agent of the government, took
the responsibility and started the Scheme. Two conditions were attached
to the government's decisions to manage it this ways "First, it was
emphasized that the Scheme must be completely flexible j second, the
financial risks involved were fully recognized and were considered
justified because of the acute world shortage of oils and fats and
that the residue after the extraction of the oil would be used to feed
the cows to increase milk production in the country." u
Progress in 19^7
Progress in 19h7 was slow and frustrating. Nevertheless, it was
on January 20 of that year when the advance party -^ arrived at Kongwa
in the central province of Tanganyika. Their first duty was to prepare
for the arrival of equipment expected to be used for clearing the bush.
The group also aimed at having 1^0,000 acres ready for the first planting
2%orld Today , op. cit., Vol. 17, p. 107. See also, His Majesty's
Stationery Office (ed. ), A Plan for the Mechanized Production of Ground-
nuts in East and Central Africa (London? September 20, 19^6), pp. 38-39.
(Hereafter cited as Cmd. 7030.)
2
^The (london) Times , February 6, 19ii7.
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anticipated to take place toward the end of the year.
The Kongwa region was selected as the nucleus of the entire operation
because of its geographical suitability. It is approximately 3500 feet
/e sea level and about 2I4O miles from the port of Dar-es-Salaara. °
Its characteristics are nredominately tropical (see its position on
map on following page).
A miscalculation contributed to the slowness and frustration.
The end of the year had been chosen to make the first planting. This
was wrong because it was to be a drier season when the area would re-
ceive only about five inches of rain. However, planting should have
been done between Llay 1 and October 31.
Another problem was that the equipment did not arrive as anticipated.
Some old equipment used in fighting the war in the Far East was shipped
in but was not as efficient as expected. The order for new equipment
was delayed, thus contributing to a very disappointing start, which was
further retarded by the shortage of fuel in Britain, unfavorable weather
conditions at sea, waterl^oged spots on the Tanganyika Railway, crowding
at the port of Dar-es-Salaam and a shortage of skilled African labour
due to slow recruitment and insufficient training facilities. At the
end of this first year, roughly 9000 acres instead of 1^0,000 had been
cleared and planted with groundnuts.
However, all aspects were not bad. Some went very well. The yield
per acre, for example, had been estimated to be 83>0 pounds but it turned
26„
Fullard, o£. cit
., p. 10,
KEHYA
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Dar-es-Salaam
^K_v4_VH_^3j;Major Port)
The nucleus of operation
NORTHERN RHODESIA
(Zaisb now)
Lake Nyasa
MOZAMBIQUE
Map of Tanganyika Showing Location of Kongwa2 '
27
'Pullardp loc. cit.
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out to be 900 pounds. Then, there had been predictions that the market
price would fall but it went up considerably. Also, although initially
^low, th^re were no grave difficulties in recruiting African workers.
It was surprising and rather encouraging to find that the African chiefs
cooperated in the recruiting process and even expressed their sincere
approval of the entire project. In general, the Africans were enthusiastic
and willing to work. Some came from other territories such as Kenya and
Rhodesia—areas proposed in the original plan. Others walked long distances
to Kongwa. The rate at which they mastered the basic principles of
machine operation was certainly very encouraging. °
After some progress had been made at Kongwa, two other areas were
placed under cultivation. These were western and southern provinces.
The western region, whose headquarters was to be Urambo, is situated 60
miles west of Tabora in central Tanganyika and about 500 miles west of
Dar-es-Salaam on the east coast. It is about 35>00 feet above sea levelj
the whole area ranges between 35>00 and 14000 feet and is a part of the
central African plateau. The rainfall is almost the same as Kongwa,
only 33 inches a year, most of it falling from December to May. The
rail in some places is rich red loam and in other places it is gray
sand. Nearly the whole region is covered with dry forest. However,
the general vegetation is tropical grassland or savanna. The target
here was to develop at least 60,000 acres of land. 29
Anon., "Report on the First Year's i-rogress," Review of the River
rlate (February 6, 19li8), pp. 17-19.
29
Bunting, o£. cit., p. 699.
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The southern province is different from the other two regions, both
geographically and technically. It is relatively low, 1200 feet to
3000 feet above sea level. The rainfall, caused mainly by the monsoon
winds, ranges from 30 to LiO inches a year, falling mostly from November
to April. These regular seasonal winds blow one direction during one
season and in exactly the opposite direction in the other. They are
caused by the land mass of Asia and the Indian Ocean. Daring the
northern summer, the land mass in Asia gets hot, causing the air to
rise and develop a low pressure region. Air over the Indian Ocean, most
of which lies south of the equator, is cool and heavy, causing a high
pressure region. The resultant southeast monsoons then blow from the
Indian Ocean toward Asia.
When the sun swings south, the low pressure belt swings with it.
Air over Asia is cold and heavy and so blows southward causing the
northeast monsoons. Since these winds are regular, rain in this region
is more dependable than in the other two. 30 fhe following map shows
the geographical position of the two provinces and the direction of the
monsoon winds,
^
The vegetation is generally the same as in the other regions-
tropical grassland. However, there are heavier forests in some parts
because of the greater rainfall.
30
"East African Groundnuts Plant The first stages Advance party
already in Tanganyika: Food Minister says he envisages similar enter-
prises," Crown Colonist > Vol. XVII (May ±9h7} s p. 25>3.
WJ Fullard, op_. cit., p. 12.
19
7/—S.E. Monsoons
N.E. Monsoons
Location of Western and Southern Province and
Direction of Monsoon Winds
The amount of rain and its reliability were quite encouraging.
But the experts thought perhaps the lour elevation would make the area
suitable only for pastoral development; however, they decided to de-
velop about 65,000 acres. This groundnut region lies about 70 miles
from Lindi, a port on the east coast just south of Dar-es-Salaam.
History and Constitution of the O.P.C.
The Overseas Food Corporation did not come into existence until
February, 19h8 s when the Overseas Resources Act was passed. This act
established two big corporations s the Colonial Development Corporation
and the Overseas Food Corporation. 32 The duties of the Colonial Develop-
ment Corporation, the larger of the two, were to develop colonial ter-
ritories. The O.F.C. was charged with:
1. Securing the investigation, formulation, and carrying
out of projects for production or processing in
places outside the United Kingdom of foodstuffs,
and for the marketing of foodstuffs or such products
j
and
2. As the first project to be carried out by them,
securing the large scale production of groundnuts,
together with crops rotational therewith or ancil-
lary thereto, in colonial territories in East and
Central Africa, and the marketing thereof. 33
The constitution called for a governing board comprised of a
chairman, a deputy chairman and not less than four nor more than ten
other members as the Minister of Food should from time to time determine.
32
Economic Development , lop , cit. , Also see Overseas Food Corporation,
Report and Accounts for 19L\3-19k9 (London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, September 1, 19li9), p. 1.
3%ill and Moffet, op_. cit., p. £li2.
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The selection of the members was to be based upon the individual indi-
cation of capacity to carry out the required duties. This would be
indicated by such things as experience, education and training. Sir
Leslie i'lummer was appointed Chairman and took office in March, 19li8.
The government had a great deal of confidence in him because of his
reputable record. A. J. V,rakefield, who headed the Government Investi-
gation Mission, was a member of the board. J. N. Rosa, a South African-
born banker, a member of Wakefield's mission which went to East Africa
to investigate the feasibility of the Scheme, was also appointed to the
board. He and Wakefield were later dismissed because it was felt that
they contributed to the improper running of the O.F.C. J. McFadyen,
first Deputy Chairman, remained full-time member of the board after
being replaced by Sir Donald Perrot. He was mainly responsible for
supplies and transport. ^
The O.F.C. was allowed to borrow Z 50,000,000, and a further
L 5,000,000 as temporary borrowings. The activities of the O.F.C.
are explained in detail in different sections of the Act. It was made
clear that the O.F.C. was entirely responsible to the Minister of Food.
In carrying out its activities, not only in the colonies but elsewhere
outside Britain, collaboration with local governments was necessary.
For example, in Australia it had to work with the government of Queensland
in growing coarse grain to feed cattle. In colonial territories it could
undertake its activities only at the invitation of the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.
-^"A Much Discussed Venture—The Government's Groundnuts Scheme:
Officials, and Scene," The Illustrated London News , November 26, 19^9,
P. 813.
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The act stated specifically that the interests of the native people
should be carefully safeguarded. The corporation -was instructed to set
up committees as required for the purpose of looking into certain condi-
tions and needs of the natives. Consultations with local authorities
for the purpose of safety, health and general welfare of the employees
of the Corporation was also a part of its obligations, thus reflecting
the desire of British Colonial Administration to develop and to prepare
the colonies for independence. It can also be added that the labour
government wanted to improve imperial relations by paying attention to
the needs of the people.
The Bill (the Act of 19k 3) did not appear to the House of Commons
to be controversial except for the clause relating to the transfer of
the Seheme from the United Africa Company to the O.F.C. The opposition
(conservatives) and some Labour members did not like the way the govern-
ment was handling it. They ranted the Scheme to become a part of the
Colonial Development Corporation at a later date. The government argued
that the opposition's insistence for amendment was illogical because
both the Colonial Development Corporation and the O.F.C. were public
organizations and thus it made no difference i^hich took over the respon-
sibility of running the Scheme.
Two significant facts relating to this bill are important to note.
"First, it was sponsored by five Ministers of the Crown—-the Minister
of Food, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Minister for Economic Affairs, and the Secretary of State for the Common-
wealth Relations."^ Second, it was a new measure whereby colonies
^World Today, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 110.
were to be developed by a 'ovorament-sponsored organization and so it
was received enthusiastically both by the political leaders and by the
public. "Here undoubtedly," said Oliver Stanley, chief spokesman for
the opposition, "is a measure on which it is possible for all sections
of the House to agree."-'"
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the background of the Groundnut
Scheme, touching the major portion of the Colonial Development and 7felfare
idea later extended in the acts of 1929, I9I4O, 19*5, and 19U8 and was
run by the O.F.C. Some specific reasons why the Scheme was considered
necessary have been discussed as have been a summary of the original
plan and the original cost and time estimates. The later realization
of the impracticability of the estimates which led to slow and disap-
pointing progress during the first year has been sketched.
A brief account of the technical problems in terms of machinery,
geography, climate, and transportation is included. Since the Scheme
was undertaken by a public organization, the discussion of the O.F.C.,
its duties, extent of operation and officials, became a necessity.
The Scheme ended in a fiasco for many and varied reasons. Whether
they were related to political, economic or social aspects of the East
African milieu or to managerial lack of knowledge or to an excess of
ambition on the part of the British is an aspect that requires careful
discussion later.
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CHAPTER II
TRANSPORTATION: ITS PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
General Outlook
The importance of the East African Groundnut Scheme was nation-wide
as well as world-wide in terms of the reasons for which it was established.
Its success depended on careful and highly technical methods from the
beginning, but as time went on, it found itself handicappted by technical,
administrative, racial, social, medical and transportation problems. These
were not only akin to the scheme, but had always existed in the colonies,
and still persist. Agricultural problems were largely new. All of these
difficulties, together with the search for methods to solve them, created
a unique situation resulting in the failure of the original plan.
The most crucial problems were those relating to transportation ser-
vices. The regions selected lay far inland from supply centers. They
were also uninhabited and completely devoid of civilized facilities.
Unquestionably, the cost and time taken in transporting equipment would
affect planning and provisioning. That transportation contributed to
protracted delay is revealed in two areas: in the overloading of estab-
lished transport facilities, and in the total lack of normal facilities
in certain areas. Regarding the first, at least a half-year's delay
Medwyn Ormerod, "The Transportation Problems of the East African
Groundnut Scheme," Journal of the Institute of Transport , Vol. XXIII
(July 195>0), pp. 351-358. Mr. Ormerod was Transportation Manager,
Overseas Food Corporation, London.
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resulted from the overloading j regarding the second, it was important
to remerrber that transport facilities were not the only limitations
in the regions.
Existing Transportation Facilities
The fact that transportation problems were crucial did not neces-
sarily mean that there was nothing like modern transportation, i-rior
to the coming of the English and the Germans in the late 19th century,
the east coast of Africa had been under the influence of the Arab and
rersian traders for many centuries. These traders sailed from their
own ports with the help of the northeast monsoons and sailed back with
the help of the southwest monsoons. Therefore, they built trading ports
along the east coast of which Mombasa, Dar-es-tSalaam and Zanzibar were
the most important. They traded in slaves, ivory, gold, and spices.
To get these commodities they had to penetrate into the interior. The
traders made a few crude routes which extended as far as Ujiji on the
shores of Lake Tanganyika and northward to the southern shores of Lake
Victoria. iVhen the British and Germans came, they took advantage of
these early establishments and made appreciable and rapid expansion.
Shipping services, therefore, had operated from Mombasa in Kenya through
Tanga and Dar-es-3alaam in Tanganyika and Zanzibar on the Island of
Zanzibar to Beria in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), a distance of
1,23>0 nautical miles. After a half-century, from about 1895 to 19b5, the
British had made numerous improvements on the ports although deep-berth
ports and intermediate lighter ports were limited. Regular liner services
ran to them from various parts of the world.
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Railways
The Germans lost Tanganyika after the First World War. It became
a British Trusteeship Territory and the administrative system was pat-
terned after that of Kenya and Uganda, In 191*8, it was possible to
amalgamate Tanganyika railways with those of Kenya and Uganda. Since
then they have operated under the East African Railways and Harbours
Authority, with its headquarters in Nairobi.
Prior to 19li3, the Tanganyika railway system comprised one main
line and some small branches. The main line ran, as it still does, from
Dar-es-Salaam through Tabora in the Central Province to Kigoma on the
shores of Lake Tanganyika on the extreme west. Another line ran from
Tanga, also on the east coast, to Arusha close to the slopes of Mt.
Kilimanjaro. The Mtwara-Nachingwea line was constructed in the extreme
south and was to be of great service to the Southern Province operation.
Then a branch ran from Tabora northward to Mwanza on the southern shore
of Lake Victoria. The Gulwe-Hogoro branch, which passed through Kongwa,
was specially constructed for the Scheme in this area.^
Airways and Roads^
The airways ?fere also very limited in scope. The East African Air-
ways Corporation, though expanding very rapidly was of very little help
^Ibid
. 9 p. 3£l. See also B. F. Richardson, "Britain's Groundnut
Scheme in East Africa," Journal of Ge ography , Vol. L (April 193>1)> P. 15>1.
3
See map, Reproduced from Anon., "Air Transport in Africa Today;
The Groundnut Scheme," The Aeroplane , Vol. LXXVI (March 25, 19h9), p. 339.
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as far as the selected regions were concerned,. Only a few airports,
such as Dar-es-Salaam, Tabora and Mbaja existed. Moreover, it- was
difficult to transport heavy equipment by air even to accessible areas.
Roads were also limited and their immediate construction rendered
another serious problem. Hills and deep valleys, particularly the great
rift through the center of the country from north to south, added to this
difficulty. The steep escarpment separating the plateau from the coastal
strip made road construction difficult without modern machinery. The
few roads that were in existence were poorly constructed, dusty in dry
months and muddy and impassable for heavy traffic in wet months. These
limited systems left many areas impenetrable.
Some New Considerations
An effective transport system was required to provide for the move-
ment and distribution of supplies and the shipment of produce. The first
area to be selected was in the Central Province around Kongwa. Only a
liO-mile railway had to be constructed to connect Kongwa to the main line.
Urambo lay some $7$ miles farther west of Dar-es-Salaam but still close
to the main line. Neither of these areas offered adequate agricultural
land for the Scheme so future groundnut expansion had to be carried on
substantially in the Southern Province where transport problems were
special and crucial.
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Specific Problems Pertaining to the Southern Province
The Southern Province had been surveyed and judrred suitable for the
operation. The first problem was to select a site for building a port.
A mission led by P, E. Millboarn, Adviser on Shipping in i-'ort to the
Minister of Transport, ^ left London to look into this problem. The
mission reported in March, 19^7, that Mtwara had been selected as the
most suitable. A railway line was to be constructed from here to run
across the Southern Province to the shores of Lake Nyasa and connect to
Northern Rhodesia by lake service. It was also proposed that this line
would be joined to the central system in central Tanganyika thus pro-
viding a sound communication among the three regions. Since Northern
Rhodesia was one of the selected areas, the line would serve it, too.
The expansion of the scheme was not restricted to Kenya, Tanganyika
and Northern Rhodesia. Nyasaland, also a British Protectorate, lay close
by and its climate and geographical conditions were not different. There-
fore, the southern railway was to be of economic and strategic importance
not only to the future of Tanganyika and Rhodesia but to Nyasaland as well.
This plan for the Southern Province also included the construction
of a pipeline. This was to cover a distance of about 128 miles and its
purpose was to deliver large quantities of fuel from the coast to the
interior. The base tanks were estimated to hold 12,000 tons, the pipehead
Ormerod, op_. cit
., p. 3 £3.
Anon., "Mechanized Production of Groundnuts in Africa; Ambitious
Scheme to Cultivate Over 3,000,000 Acres in Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia
and Kenya," Crown Colonist (March 19b7), p. 175 (especially paragraph
one).
30
tanks 8,000 and the line itself to hold h,000 to meet the required needs.
The first railway construction was started at Mkwaya and was opened
as far as Nangauga in August, 19U9. The Mtwara line, which was con-
structed later, had to link up with the Mkwaya line and extend about 8l
miles as a single line to Nachingwea, which was to be the Area Head-
quarters for the Southern Province. This line was intended to link with
the planned north-south railway from Northern Rhodesia through Tanganyika
to Kenya. The importance of the line was not limited to the Groundnut
Scheme. It went further by becoming a part of the whole East African
transport system when the East African Railways and Harbours Adminis-
tration took over the responsibility of running the Scheme from the
O.F.C. in April, X9k9*
The Port of Dar-es-Salaam and Its Limitations
In the port of Dar-es-Salaam the problem was of a different nature.
It was an old port and very few improvements had been made. After the
war there was a substantial increase in traffic and by 19h9 there was
severe congestion which led to delays in shipment both to and from Great
6
Britain. These affected the Groundnut Scheme as well as the Tanganyika
Government Department of Commercial Traders and the whole East African
Railways and Harbours group.
Representatives of the British government, the Tanganyika government,
and East African Railways and Harbours consulted together and agreed to
u
"The East African Groundnut Scheme: Report on the First Year's
Progress," Review of River Plate 5 February 6, I9I48, p. 17.
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eliminate the causes of these delays II f Le. The first
step was to study the conditions at the port of Dar-es-Salaam. Operations
like stevedoring, lighterage, quay cranage, clearance from the port area
by rail and, to some extent, by road were scrutinized as were the man-
made port facilities on a smaller scale. The amount of the lightera
quay, for example, was l,Ii6o feet; while stora^.f5 sheds had a volume of
about l£,000 deadweight tons. Finally, the open space reserved for
stacking and quay handling was very limited.'
In general, the f ort was under constant pressure. Before the war,
the amount of traffic was 130,000,000 freight tons every year. Between
lck7-19iiS, this figure increased to well over 1*00,000 tons and by 19b 9
it had risen to more than 3>00,000 tons. The Scheme was held responsible
for this increase; from 19^7 to 19lt9 its traffic amounted to more than
65,000 tons annually. In 19kl, this increase resulted in the appoint-
ment of a committee to regulate the traffic in Dar-es-Salaara. Members
of the committee represented the port itself, East African Railways
and Harbours authorities, and the O.F.C. It was also necessary to set
up a corresponding committee in London representing the lines, the Crown
Agents and the O.F.C. The main duty of the London committee was to
program O.F.C. shipments.
The whole problem was so sophisticated that some of the things could
not be controlled at both ports. Treaties gave to the port of Dar-es-
Salaam heavy traffic from ports other than London. For example, freight
from the Belgian Congo by the way of Lake Tanganyika went through the
7
Ormerod, loc . cit
.
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port. The situation also revealed deficiences in the system for regis-
tration of cargoes for shipment from Great Britain. To improve the
situation, a number of shippers employed the device of registering more
traffic than they actually had available. This device was used mainly
in the case of motor ears which were singled out as the roost limiting
factor in handling traffic.
In January, 19k9 f a conference met in London to revise the programs
as a remedy to the problem. There were two types of programs—short-
term and long-term. The short-term developments were based on the present
lighterage layout. Under this, improvements relating to additional equip-
ment were put in order and a decision was reached as to the additional
loadings ac soon as these new suggestions were effected.
In March, 19hl, a long-term development was published and sent to
the Bast African High Commission (now, East African Organization Service)
which was responsible for the central administration of organisations
like East African Railways and Harbours, Post and Telecommunication Ser-
vices, Higher Education, and East African Customs and Duties, and others.
The development proposals encompassed provision for deep berths and a
possible outlet through Mombasa for the produce from the central part
of Tanganyika. The distance from central Tanganyika to Mombasa was far
greater than to Dar-es-Salaam and it was anticipated that this proposal
would be more costly, although it was a useful alternative.
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Specific Problems Pertaining to Railways
The railways had difficulties of their own. The major ones re-
sulted from tropical weather conditions and transit of equipment from
abroad. The difficulties should have been avoided because they had been
experienced during the war when the demands were so urgent.
The weather conditions in tropical Africa are characterized by
heavy rains in certain months of the year and severe drought in other
months due to change of direction of the monsoons (referred to in
Chapter I). They are responsible for violent thunderstorms which affect
the railway transportation greatly. Even by 19h9, the railway system
in Tanganyika was not yet of high quality. After heavy rains, the soil
would be washed away from the lines, especially in steep areas. They
would sink and traffic would be stopped for an indefinite period. During
the drought, the effect was just as great because the ground would dry
up, become dusty, crack, and would, consequently, be hazardous to trains.
The fleet of about sixty line locomotives was enlarged by "Garratts"
shipped from Burma, by sixteen "MacArthurs" from Malaya, and six "li-8-2s"
of 19^6 United Kingdom manufacture followed by ten more of home manufacture
in 19h9.^ Different types of wagons (freight cars) were also ordered
from about 19h7 to 19h9. During the 19h9 drought, which was the most
severe since the Scheme was started, new tank cars had to be brought in
o
J.F.R. Hill and J. P. Moi'fet, Tanganyika
;
A Review of Its Resources
and Their Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Government of Tanganyika, 19i>5),
p. lE9T~
o
Ormerod, op. cit.
, p. 353.
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immediately because the existing fleet had to be used for carrying
water instead of oil. In the rating system, a reduced rate on exports
on "any station" basis had to be devised to stimulate export production
especially among producers in the up-country. ^ Relating to groundnut
produce traffic, it was decided that special arrangements were necessary
to have rates fixed which would be published according to established
procedure. A combined tariff was also worked out to apply to all three
territories-—Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika . *-'-
Road Transport
There were inadequate railways to start with because the lines
to the key areas—Kongwa and Nachingwea in the Southern Province—had
not been constructed. This meant that, in its initial stages, the
Scheme relied mainly on roads for both short and long distances. The
first group which started its work at Kongwa in 19h7 was sustained partly
by road transport from Nairobi, a distance of more than £00 miles. From
Dar-es-Salaam to Kongwa by road was about 35>0 miles and the first convoy
from there arrived at Kongwa in June 19^7 • These roads were dirty,
muddy in rainy seasons and dusty during drought. In the rainy season
they became impassable and the arrival of supplies was delayed for many days.
The sources did not give the existing rate and also did not indi-
cate how much reduction was made. Also, they did not show what the
established procedure was.
1]
-Richardson, ojd. cit., pp. l50-l57.
^"Transport and the Groundnut Scheme," World's Carriers , Vol. XLVI
(February l£, 19^0), pp. 191-192.
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The O.F.C. also found itself s^ort of a road fleet because of de-
lays in delivery. This made it necessary to buy some vehicles that w<
military remnants . They were bought from Belgian, Italy and Egypt.
These old vehicl *e not veryeffective j they presented many opera-
tional and maintenance problems. Spare parts, not available in Tanganyika,
had to be shipped in in large numbers. A normally effective operating
fleet was not available for some time. Meanwhile, an order for new
vehicles designed for local conditions had been sent in. It had been
estimated that the Scheme would have about 2,000 vehicles with which to
operate by 19h8. At the same time, local people were being trained as
drivers. Other measures were also being taken to eliminate equipment
deficiencies in general, to improve bad roads, train inexperienced
workers and install petrol (filling) stations.
Air Transport
Air transportation was the most limited. But, it was found to be
a necessity for two reasons: first, it was faster; second, it was
cheaper in transporting families and employees both from Great Britain
and within East Africa.
The O.F.C. contracted privately owned charter planes, and from
November 1, 19^9, it engaged in extensive contracts with the British
Overseas Airways Corporation. In East Africa air transport was widely-
used for local journeys and the East African Airways Corporation supplied
most of the services by connecting the big cities and ports to the ground-
nut areas. However, for the sake of effectiveness, the O.F.C. sometimes
had to charter aircraft for internal air freight work.
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Some Special Slipping Considerations
The only means to get heavy, massive equipment from the United
Kingdom and foreign countries like the United States, Canada, Belgium
and Italy, was by sea. For this reason a new system, called "Liner
Conference," was introduced, as a means of putting together independent
private undertaking to avoid the worst features of competition. The
East African Conference Line was one of these lines, and it did a remarkable
job of shipping large quantities of cargo which the Scheme needed so
badly; however, difficulties remained. The two ports, Dar-es-Salaam
and in particular Lindi, were too small to admit large vessels, especially
those used by commercial shippers and Crown Agents to ship heavy cargoes.
Finally, inconvenient storage as well as insufficient derrick capacities
also added to these problems.
Certain measures had to be adopted to ease the shipping and un-
loading of the required equipment and supplies. More careful prepar-
ations were made before shipping j caution was used in handling the
equipment during unloading. It was also thought that most of the equip-
ment would be safer if it was delivered on wheels or tracks.
Operating in an area that was entirely new, things were done on an
experimental basis $ so, in shipping of equipment, some experiments were
carried on. Those that proved successful were: crating in asbestos
sheeting was found to be an economical way of reducing damage j equipment
covered with sheeting or grease was put on the deck with little or no
damage j and small equipment was put together into large packages.
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The standard of handling was also quite high. ^
These devices proved effective and encouraging. Some people argued
that more efficient rates were established through cooperation between
large corporations and the Conference Lines than thoso established by
the usual commercial practice. Others argued that it did not make much
difference except that it facilitated shipping requirements.
Transportation Within the United Kingdom
After looking thoroughly into effective means of handling supplies
and equipment in East Africa, particularly at the ports of D?r-es-
Salaam, Lindi and Mtwara, it was recognized that related transportation
requirements in the United Kingdom also had to be studied. Such re-
quirements were connected with work done at the port such as packing
into boxes, labeling, loading and assuring that all required equipment
was loaded.
Although the O.F.C. operated like a free private commercial enter-
prise, public cooperation was fairly high. Since it was a government
organization, the public had the responsibility of meeting most of the
financial obligations involved. An effective transport system for the
Scheme depended on effective home transport, a public concern. Of this
relationship, Ormerod said:
It is not difficult to appreciate the great administrative
and technical problems at present confronting the British
Transport Commission. On the other hand, it is inevitable
Ormerod, op_. cit
., p. 357.
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that users look forward to signs of the resolution in par-
ticular of the problems of integration and charging1^ policy.
Meantime, one has found one's loyalty over-strained when
the apologists of a particular transport media have ad-
vanced technological merits not borne out by the charges,
and it is no doubt disappointing to the Commission itself
that circumstances have forced it to apply for railway rating
increases before the process of rating rail to other ser-
vices is advanced. 15
He pointed out that home transport operators had willingly worked
together with the scheme and that such cooperation deserved appreciation.
He praised the British Railways for handling heavy equipment and said
this was quite successful. He also praised the Road Haulage Executive^
for handling a considerable proportion of traffic for the scheme.
Transport of the Produce
Transportation of Produce comprised three major stages; preparation
of the nuts in the field, rail transport, and shipping. The nuts in the
shell were collected by combine harvesters and put into bags. The bags
were transported from the field by tractors drawn by agricultural trailers
to neighbouring railway stations where they were stored in bulk. This
necessitated adequate storage space at each loading station. It was
discovered that bagged undecorticated groundnuts covered close to 100
cubic feet per ton in stacks 15 feet high. Therefore, 10,000 tons of
groundnuts needed approximately 70,000 square feet. Storage in the open
^Sources give "charging" but because of possibility of printing
errors, the word could be "changing."
15World's Carriers, op . cit
. , p. 192.
l^Road Haulage Executive was a government agency introduced under
the Transit Act (no date given) to handle some of the traffic.
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instead of i) storage wan used because it was cheaper and the
groundnuts were just as safe as they would be in sheeted storage.
The process of the nuts took place at the railway stations,
they were then shipped in bagi in ^O-ton wagons. At \ "-t the nuts
were removed from the baglj put into the storage bins and loaded into
the ships by means of mechanical gear. Shipping groundnuts unbagged in
large quantities would save 7 1/2 per cent of space but precautions
against damage had to be taken. Shelled nuts were vulnerable to breakage
due to handling or excess moisture j nevertheless, the completion of the
deep berths allowed storage in the bags at the port until it wa<5 con-
venient to ship them.
This concluded the transportation problems which faced the East
African Scheme. Possible solutions were put forth and implemented.
The way was o^en for changes in the future as more experience and
knowledge were gained.
CHAPTER III
TECHNICAL ASPECTS INVOLVED
While information regarding the physical characteristics of the
areas was readily available from the Department of Education in Tanganyika
and the Meteorological and Survey Departments of the East African Com-
mission, the technological aspects were unknown. This chapter will be
predominantly concerned with these aspects which will cover vegetation
and clearing, soil types, water conservation, soil fertility, experi-
mental crop studies, crop mechanization, plant protection and organi-
zational aspects of the entire scheme. Of the three territorial areas
designated for the Scheme, Tanganyika was selected as the starting ter-
ritory. Here, three places were chosen. These areas, as mentioned
earlier, were Kongwa in the central province, Urambo situated farther
west, and the Southern Province. They were chosen on the basis of
availability of land, geographical location, climatic conditions in
relation to seasonal distribution of rain and to the amount required
for growing the nuts.
Vegetation and Soil Types
Tanganyika has many hills, valleys and plains. Rainfall, which is
the chief determinant of vegetation, varies from place to place but the
difference among the amounts in the three areas (Kongwa, Urambo and the
Southern Province) is not great. Vegetation, however, is not homogenous
due to elevation. A vegetation analysis of Africa categorized the whole
of Tanganyika (now called the Republic of Tanzania) into tropical grasslands
Ill
but this was not supported by the evidence of the vegetation from these
specific areas. It was found that Kongwa was covered with thick, thorny,
impenetrable deciduous trees and shrubs like accacia and baobabs. Grassy
patches existed where shallow lakes had been. The southern and western
regions were covered with variants of plants called miorabo which extended
over a limitless area and in some places were found with leguminous types
of plants—a vegetation which typifies the tropical grasslands which
covers most of the Sudan, East Africa, and even the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.
Groundnuts are leguminous plants, too, and it was believed that they
would flourish very well in these areas.
2
After the study of vegetation was complete, the stages of development
and the methods to be employed were determined. Four stages were described.
Since no good maps were available during the investigation, it was decided
to make topographic, soil and vegetation maps on the basis of aerial and
ground photographs. The main purpose here was to determine how much land
was available, the extent of the units and the character of soil conser-
vation systems. The maps would also help in directing the cutting down
of the bush and in determining where to locate unit headquarters and work-
shop installations.
A. H. Bunting, "Technical Aspects of the East Africa Groundnuts
Organisation," Annals of Applied Biology , Vol. XXXVII (December, 1950),
p. 700. See also A. II. 3unting, "Land Development and Large Scale Food
Production in East Africa by the Overseas Food Corporation," Economic
Botany
, Vol. VI (January-March, 1952), pp. 56-59. Bunting was a biologist
who first worked with the O.F.C., and now was with Research Division,
Ministry of Agriculture, Wad Medani, in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
o
*A. H. Bunting, "Technical Aspects of the East Africa Groundnuts
Organization," loc . cit.
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These survey operations were followed by scientific work directed
at determining soil types, genetic relationships, and soil formation and
behavior. Most soils were red earth $ however, in some places they were
formed from transported materials. This resulted in yellow, gray and
black soils, although they remained closely related to the general red
earths,
One of the first problems the O.F.C. faced in the initial stages
of the scheme was that of clearing vast areas of forests and bushes.
New methods and equipment were required to work in these unexplored areas.
Older settled areas of East Africa had been cleared by hand by barking,
felling and burning the dry bushes. But this was crude, slow, and im-
practicable for working land on a massive scale. Before the xvar, in
special areas such as sisal plantations and the coffee and tea fields
of Kenya, mechanical methods had been used but only a limited area could
be worked. For example, by 19h3, the Kenya Government managed to clear
only 3*000 acres of forest and bush on a contract basis. The modern
equipment used was five caterpillar DS tractors, Le Tourneau bulldozers
and Le Tourneau H3 rooters.^ Roots had to be collected by hand because
machinery could not do it. Clearing operations for the Scheme were started
in April, 19li7. Within two years, 81,000 acres had been cleared at Kongwa,
by the following year 65,000 acres at Urambo and 6,000 acres in the Southern
Province had been cleared.
3
J. MacBride, et al., "Mechanized Land Clearing 5 A Survey of Four
Years' Experience in Tanganyika," World Crops , Vol. Ill (March, 19E>1),
pp. 89-9ln These pages give a general account of clearing experience
at Kongwa and Urambo.
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Clearing, Rooting, and Stumping
Before felling the trees, tractor? suitable for knocking down trees
were first used to penetrate the bushes so that caterpillar D8 type could
be driven through later. The caterpillar D8 type was first tried at
Urambo.
The clearing system was coupled with the soil conservation system
hich aimed at conserving rain water and preventing run-off. At Kongwa,
fallen trees and bushes were piled up on contour lines which formed the
basis for this conservation system. In other areas the bushes were simply
piled up and burned because conservation was not a question of urgency.
Contours, first prepared at vertical intervals of three feet which proved
inadequate, were extended to 9-foot intervals. At Urambo piling was not
a difficult problem because the chain method used caused the trees to
fall in one direction. They could be dragged and piled together with
ease.
Rooting and stumping were the most unsatisfactory of all the oper-
ations. The Le Tourneau three-tined road rippers^ drawn by D8 tractors
were used but they soon were filled with roots making them incapable of
working effectively. Gladwell rooters^ were introduced and used exten-
sively in all three areas but they suffered the same problem as the D8s.
Ibid
., p. 91.
A. L. Gladwell of Nairobi played a major role in the development
of these clearing methods. The rooters were named in his honor. See
Ibid
., pp. 91-92 for Davis plough and other types of ploughs and rooters,
Davis ploughs were also tried but they cut the roots without extracting
them making it impossible to use lighter implements such as rakes and
harrows.
Tractors from the United States made by Caterpillar, Allis Chalmers,
and International were generally effective. The British Shervick tractors
introduced in I9I48 in the Southern Province were found less effective
than the American tractors because of long experience of American manu-
facturers. Design and maintenance were problems common to both British
and American tractors. Designed for earth moving and road construction,
they were not heavy enough to fell trees. Maintenance and repairs were
difficult because there were insufficient workshops to handle all the
equipment.
Clearing methods used at Urambo differed from those used at Kongwa.
This was due to rainfall differences. At Urambo the rainfall amount was
higher and erosion on cleared fields and roads was consequently greater.
Square layouts used at Kongwa were not feasible at Urambo. Clearing was
related to topography. It was easier to clear, remove the stumps, level,
layout the farms and benches on plain land than on hilly, rolling land.
This was a major feature on the Southern Province highlands.
At Kongwa a topographic survey was not possible before the land
was cleared because surveying equipment was not available. Surveying
was done at Urambo before clearing and was very helpful in guiding the
clearing operation. Air photographs had been prepared by the Colonial
Ibid . For more information, see Anon., "The East African Groundnut
Scheme: Report on the First Year's Progress," Review of the River Plate ,
February 6, 19U8, pp. 17-18.
it*
Surveys Organization and the O.F.C. used these preliminary ra^hs
as a basis for further surw .
A hurried beginning, inoperable equipment, and need for constant
overhaul of equipment made work difficult. Heavy equipment was not
reaching its destination. The Agricultural Director' of the project
said, "Of the first 35>0 track-type tractors that arrived in Dark-es-
Salaam, approximately 90 per cent moved from the port under their own
power; by November, only 10 per cent were still in operation. "° At
Kongwa there were 800 heavy tractors ; at Lindi there were five new heavy
ones and twenty-six Shervick tractors which had not been tested for the
work. Great Britain was unable to supply the immediate equipment needs
and so the only solution was to resort to second-hand equipment used by
the United States Array in the Philippines. Meanwhile, new equipment was
ordered from the United States and Canada; but this presented two problems:
first, Great Britain did not have enough funds to buy goods from dollar
countries; second, it took a long time to get this equipment from the
Canadian firm, liassey-Harris, which had to supply most of the machinery
for the first two years.9
7
The name of the Agricultural Director was not given in the sources,
o
H. Akers, "Britain's African Peanut Project," Foreign Agriculture
,
Vol. XIII (May 19*j9), pp. 112-113.
°B. F. Richardson, "Britain's Groundnut Scheme in East Africa,"
Journal of Geography
,
Vol. L (April 1951), pp. lH>0-l5l. Also see
L. D. Stamp, Africa ; A Study in Tropical Development (New York:
Chapman and Hall, 1953), p. Ii22 and F. N. Howes, op_. £it., pp. 26-29.
These sources contain related material but some differ on some specific
things like the number of tractors and the acres cleared. Figures are
merely approximations.
he
After four years labour, approximately 97*000 acres had been prepared
for planting. Of this, 81,000 were at Kongwa, lij s £00 at Urambo and 1,000
in the Southern Province. As noted earlier, effective measures to pre-
serve rain water for irrigation were an essential part of the clearing
system as it was also for control of erosion risks. The money and time
factors did not permit construction of dams, benches and contours
|
nevertheless, they were under plan to be worked on in the near future.
In addition, wind erosion had to be prevented. In clearing, grass
strips and additional plantings of grass and trees in appropriate places
were underway in all areas to reduce damage from wind erosion.
Soil Fertility
The scientific investigations to determine soil fertility fell into
two categories; "the laboratory physical and chemical characterization
of the main types, and the determination, by means of field experiments,
of the main plant nutrient requirements of the main crops on the main
soil types." The process appeared to be a long-term one but it pro-
vided a general view of the fertility conditions of the soils. Acid
soils were scarce but it was discovered that bush fires increased the
amount of potash. In higher, wetter areas, the amount of calcium was
relatively low so there was no need for additional lime. The most
prevalent deficiency in all areas was in phosphates which was necessary
10
A. H. Bunting, "Technical Aspects of the East Africa Groundnuts
Organization," oj>. cit,, p. 701. See also A. H. Bunting, "Agricultural
Research in the Groundnut Scheme," Mature , Vol. CLXVIII (April 21, 1951),
pp. 638-639.
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for rotational crops like maize and sorghum which used great amounts of
phosphates. Additional nitrogen was not required for groundnuts, a
leguminous crop because their nodules would supply the amount needed.
Nearly 150 experiments were conducted every year for eight major crops
—
groundnuts, sunflowers, maize, sorghum, safflower, caster bean, soya
bean and niger oil. To ensure steady and adequate progress, it was antici-
pated that this number would increase, perhaps even double.
Generally the amount of organic matter was low; on high ground, a
loss of 2 per cent in this matter was considered an exceptionally large
one. The concentration was on the effect of crop residues and other
organic materials on rotational sequences. The line followed was that
adopted by the Empire Cotton Corporation which had been successful at
ilkiriguru in Lake Province of Tanganyika.^
Crop Research
The scientific work on crops was carried on by the Research and
Scientific Department established in January 19h7, It aimed at
starting economic systems on an agricultural basis suited to each
region, and it established three experimental stations, one in each
of the three regions, each covering about 800 acres. The staff at each
"Groundnut Project Advances: East African Wastelands," Illustrated
Food Industry
,
Vol. XX (December, 19^9), p. 17U5. Comments on progress
that was being made to preserve soil fertiLity. No further explanation
was provided on what the Empire Cotton Corporation was really doing.
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Bunting, "Land Development and Large Scale Food Production in
East Africa by the Overseas Food Corporation," op_. cit
., p. 62.
station was composed of seven Europeans and a sufficient number of
Africans most of whom were in training for both laboratory and field
work. The department headquarters were Kongwa and its hierarchical
structure comprised an administnative section, a central chemical
laboratory, a library and statistical departments. There were also
specialists in each of the sections. The department suffered from a
shortage of well-trained persons because of the scope of work it had
to undertakej but it was soon realized that most of the work could be
carried on by less-well trained workers. ^
The organisational structure of experimental work on crops was as
follows: the introduction and testing of different types of crops, their
selection and breeding, and a study of cultural factors which included
population density, arrangement, cultivation, ridging and dates of
planting, and a study of crop sequence and rotations. The result of
this experimental work was the introduction of a new crop called
safflower, a thistle-like plant with large orange flowers. Dyestuffs
and a drug can be prepared from its flowers. Agricultural administrators
in other tropical countries of Africa were very cooperative in supplying
different samples of crops.
Nearly 300 varieties of groundnuts were secured from different areas
of the world. Because of the drought, the selection was centered on
getting a drought-resistant, short-seasoned type of high yielder for
Kongwa in particular. Among those selected were Natal common (probably
Ibid.» PP. 62-63. See also Anon., "The East African Groundnut
Scheme: Report on the First Xear's Progress, f' Review of the River Plate
,
February 6, 19I48, p. 18.
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from Natal in South Africa, as the name implies) and Spanish Bunch.
For a long growing season, the type raised by the natives in Tanganyika
proved more satisfactory than Natal common, especially in higher yields.
A second advantage was the seed dormancy which helped to prevent a
rosette disease. In the third place, resistance and tolerance to the
rosette disease were distinctive characteristics of this type.
Different varieties of sunflower were also introduced. Most of
them were the dwarf type and included I. ;outhner's Hungarian, i'ole Star,
Jupiter, Saturn, iYars and also Canadian selections and hybrids. The
sunflowers are fleshy shrubs which need sufficient rain to do well since
they are susceptible to drought.^ Sorghums were obtained from nearly
every continent but most came from the United States. The club-headed
type, developed in the United States, was unsuitable in East Africa,
however, because the grains on the head were so closely packed that they
formed good breeding conditions for insects and moulds during the warm
humid days. This characteristic led to the combining of the giant yel-
low Kaura (or Kifaru, as it is known in East Africa), as well as resis-
tance to storage pests favored by the presence of a horny external layer
in the mature grain.
^
a. H. Bunting, "Agricultural Research in the Groundnut Scheme,
19li7-195l: 'ork of the Overseas Food Corooration," Nature , Vol. CLXVIII
(April 21, 19S1), pp. 638-639.
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W. E. Bond, "Mechanization in Africa, Some Problems of the
Groundnut Scheme," Review of Tropical Agriculture . Vol. XXVII (July
1950), pp. 170-171.
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In maize (corn) breeding was delayed until later. However, many-
varieties had been obtained for experimental purposes. From Kenya a
dwarf yellow type was introduced at Kongua where it did very well.
Katumbili from Tanganyika and a double hybrid variety from Southern
Rhodesia were mixed with the type from Kenya to be planted in wetter
regions where they were most likely to flourish. Research indicated
that hybrid maize was needed in East Africa on a large scale but the
O.F.C. was not in a position to undertake the programme.
The soya beans from North and South America could not adapt to
equatorial cliiiiatic conditions in Tanganyika because of the long day-
light hours. The selections were then made from the samples obtained
from equatorial and subequatorial countries and appeared to do well in
the long days. Of the six varieties selected, four yielded 1,5>00 to
1,600 pounds of grain per acrej other types yielded from 100 to 900
pounds.
The O.F.C. gvew eight crops (groundnuts, sunflower, sorghum, maize,
safflower, castor bean, soya bean and niger oil) out of the thirty that
had been tested. The way remained open, however, for new crops from
tropical and sub-tropical countries which would be introduced on a
rotational basis.
Cultivational Methods
Cnltivational methods were carried on in concurrence with mechani-
zation techniques. Groundnuts were planted in rows of two, aiming at
providing enough space for each plant and at the same time maintaining
sufficient space for cultivation between the rows. However, the expected
adv . lackinj. Coupled with is tlv ncc of
rid nuts which seemed to bring wa* m9
increased water preservation, and assisted in harvesting the crop in
soils which tended to compact at the end of the rain. A significant
aspect of this undertaking was a careful study using the "gypsum"-^
block technique of cultivational practice. This was in regard to the
use of moisture and applied particularly to Kongwa where the store
of sub-soil moisture was a necessity.
In wetter regions grass was bulky. Rotation studies gave special
attention to the effects of grass on nutrition and to leaching of solu-
ble nitrogen and to the improving of soil properties. At Kongwa, at-
tention ?« ran to bare fallowing rather than tumble-down fallow-*-?
which proved wasteful. Bare fallowing was valuable in rnoroving ground-
nut yield and upland soil could be filled with water to field capacity
after one season of bare fallowing.
Results of Crop Research
"/siological investigations resulted from the whole crop research
tan conducted by the O.F.C. in 1QI)8. Investigations on the Natal
common groundnuts indicated that one -third of the weight of shelled or
decorticated nuts was deposited during the last two weeks of growth,
Gypsum is a hydrated surface of calcium occurring naturally in
sedimentary rocks and used for making plaster os! Paris, and for treating
soil. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (Cleveland
& New lork, The V/orld Publishing Co., i960).
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The sources did not provide a clear distinction between bare-
fallowing and tumble-down fallowing.
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from thirteen to fifteen weeks after sowing, and that temporary drought
during the vegetative period did not effect the growth rate. Two steps
resulted t field studies of the harvesting date, which affirmed the above
conclusions, and root bisect investigation. Concerning Matal common;
groundnuts, harvesting was supposed to be done only at the most favorable
time. If harvested too early, the yield would not be as high as expectedj
if harvested too late, the nuts would shed. In relation to root studies,
it was found that they went as deep as possible, in most cases from six
to nine feet.
Finally, studies on crops revealed the importance of controlling
surface wash which was so common in tropical regions because loss In
good rich top soil meant loss in crop yield. The established methods
were inadequate to control such loss. It was thought that ridging would
give a reasonable amount of control but with the type of machinery
available, it was not possible. At Urambo, Scientific Department
started broad ridge and furrow ploughing, making ridges twelve feet
wide in attempt to arrive at a successful way of controlling surface
wash, 1
Plant Protection
Plant protection rested on the control of outbreaks of diseases
and insect attacks from an ecological standpoint. The destruction of
tremendous stretches of virgin land meant the destruction of most existing
1 Q
A. H. Bunting wrote an article in each the Annals of Applied
Biologyj in Sc onomic Botany, and in Nature from which this material
was obtained. He ras also a co-writer of J, MacBride in an article
in World Crop s. All have been cited in previous footnotes.
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Insects like tsetse flies $ on the other hand, it also meant the appearance
of new insects and diseases, especially those that thrived on the new
crops and lived comfortably on well-cloared, cultivated land.
Effort was made to learn all the new pests and diseases and to de-
vise measures against them. Two new diseases appeared especially preva-
lent. The rosette virus disease which attacked groundnuts was carried
by Aphis craccivora (also called plant louse), an insect that lived on
plants by sucking their juice. ' The disease attacked the nuts at Urambo
resulting in about a LjO per cent crop loss, although at Kongwa the disease
was not as prevalent. The first step in controlling the aphids was to
Of)
locate the pest in the surrounding bushes. The insect was not found,
but it was thought that it came from colonies of volunteer plants which
had resisted the drought, and that it had flown avray by the help of the
wind currents to other areas. The volunteers grew from unharvested
plants which made most of the plots present a threat to the next crop.
One way to reduce that threat was to harvest more thoroughly in order
to eliminate the volunteer plants. Two other possible techniques were:
a different planting date, and different spacing. The next two tables
show the effect of each on the incidence of rosette in groundnuts at
Urambo from 191*8 to 19h9.
"Commonwealth Institute of Entomology, Bulletin of Entomological
Research
,
Vol. XXXIX (August 19li8), p. 233.
20
A. C. Evans, "Entomological Research in the Overseas Food Cor-
poration (Tanganyika), Annals of A 1 -plied Biology , Vol. XXXVIII (June
1951), p. 526. (Bunting's articles also include information on diseases
and pests but it was very sketchy.)
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Table 1
Effect of Planting Date21
Plant Numbers (thousandis/acre
)
Resetted Plant Yield
Date of Planting Total at Harvest at 15 March (lb/acre)
18 December 5i.o 3.5 989
27 December 1*6.3 ^.9 8Hi
2 January 33.3 13.5 55o
10 January 37. h 16.0 361
19 January 36.2 20.1 86
29 January itl.5 lii. 9 86
The results indicated that there was less infection in the first
two early plantings, so early planting was preferred to late planting.
Table 2
Effects of Spacing22
Spacing Within Rows Significant Differences
3 1/2" 6 1/2" 9 3A" $% 1%
Total Plants
Resetted
50.8
16.8
Spacing
35.9
17.2
Between Rows
26.7
17.5
h.9
3.0
6.1
3.8
18" (s)* 28" (S) 36"(D)+
Total Plants
Rosetted
iili.2
18.6
27.9
15.5
U.2
17.3
h.9
3.0
6.1
3.8
""S = Single rows
+D = Double rows, 6" apart with 36" between centers of double rows.
21Ibid.
22Ibid. 5 p. 527.
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After understanding that the disease was carried by an air-borne
vector (aphis) and that early pirating and wider spacing were controlling
factors, the next step was to test possible insecticides that would assist
in control. Among those tested were DDT and phosphorous anhydride.
Groundnut Pests
So far, diseases did not appear numerous but insects were plentiful.
The ones that were spotted included:
Cercopspora: a leaf spot of groundnuts, sclerotinm volfsiij a foot
rot and crown rot which attacked the seedlings and was caused by Aspergillus
niger. The foot rot was discovered to be very common in wetter regions
and was increasingly becoming a problem. Alternavia carthami was a foot
rot of sunflowers. 3
At Kongwa, a swarm of insects called Laphygma Exempta appeared in
tremendous numbers but did not spread to large areas. They were soon
consumed by migrating flocks of birds. Grasshoppers were also numerous
and they devoured the leaves. The most common one was Hilda ra truelis,
a leafhopper but which normally attacked the underground sections of the
groundnuts, killing the plant. It was controlled before it had inflicted
much damage. Termites were especially numerous in Southern rt-ovince and
were most destructive to sunflowers and maize in all three areas. Both
plants, especially those which matured early, had to remain standing in
23
Bulletin of Entomological Research
, op. cit .« Vol. XXXIX, pp. 231-
236. The bulletin gives a list of insects associated with groundnuts in
East Africa. 77. F. Jepson, O.B.E., Ih.D. who studied these insects was
an entomologist with the Department of Agriculture in Tanganyika in 1QU8.
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the fields for a considerable length of time before they were harvested.
These were normally the victims. Among the insecticides used to fight
the termites were DDT and BHC applied together with fertilizers. This
practice proved to be most effective.
Galidea dregi also destroyed sunflowers and sorghum. The growing
grains and leaves of sorghum were attacked. With the sunflower, it
penetrated through the micropyle and ate the kernel part of the plant.
Seeds were never damaged but the kernel decreased in weight while that
of the husk increased. Oil content was also reduced. At Urambo it was
estimated that about ll}0,000 of these insects occupied each acre. This
required a large amount of DDT, BHC and "pyrethrum" ^ power to bring
them under control.
The Scientific Department
The Scientific Department worked in cooperation with the Tanganyika
Department of Agriculture, the East African Agricultural Research Institute
under Dr. Storey at Amani, and the East African Agricultural Research
Organization under Dr. Keen in Nairobi. These three organizations sent
representatives to meetings of the East African Scientific Committee
and O.F.C. to supply all the information available in relation to agri-
culture in East Africa. The department also drew much information from
2\xPyrethrum is a shrub plant with long stems, finely cut leaves,
and has white, purplish or red flowers from which the insect-killing
powder is made. It has been widely grown in the Kenya highland since
World War II.
S7
British centers of research both in Britain and in the Commonwealth,
the United States and French and lielgian colonic .
Conclusion
The general results indicated that it was possible to grow different
types of crops in the three regions in Tanganyika as well as in other
partr of East Africa. But at this time it was not possible to say that
the results were completely satisfactory. More research had to be carried
on to remove the obstacles which still caused the v;ork to lag. A high
degree of confidence had been established and the future of the Scheme
was bright. Adjustment to the tropical weather conditions was gradually
being achieved, workers were keen, results were promising and cooperation
with other parties was sound.
CHAPTER I?
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE OVERSEAS FOOD CORPORATION:
CONDITIONS IN 19UB-19U9
It proved impossible for the original plan of the Groundnut scheme
to achieve its aims.-*- This did not mean that the entire scheme and the
work that had been done were valueless and needed to be abandoned al-
together. The British government still believed that the scheme was an
important undertaking and that a new set of objectives should be worked
out. It decided that the office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies
should assume the responsibility of directing it, not as an enormous under-
taking such as the original plan had indicated, but as an experimental
project.
Modification of the Plan
The original plan which called for the clearing of 3,210,100 acres
was revised because the O.F.C. found itself quite incapable of executing
it. Furthermore, the amount of money needed to pay the costs was far
greater than was originally estimated. The revised plan prepared in
1°I|8 proposed the clearing of 2,35>5 9 000 acres over a seven-year period
and at a cost of about £ 66.7 million. These figures were unacceptable
ills Majesty's Stationery Office (ed.), A Plan for the Mechanized
Production of Groundnuts in East and Central Africa ( London 5 20th
September 19U6) S hereafter cited as Cmd. 7030 (191*6). See also, His
Majesty's Stationery Office (ed.), East African Groundnuts Scheme ;
Review of Progress to the End of November , 19hl (London: 191*3), here-
after cited as Cmd. 73 lit (I9I48). He explains the progress within the
first year. It was published in January, 19h3 and the O.F.C. responsible
for the revised plan took over on March 1, 19li8.
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to the government. For this reason, another plan was submitted on
November 21, 19^9, which required the working of 600,000 acres In the
three regions by 195h* This plan was accepted and it was to be operated
on a regional basis.
Of the 600,000 acres, Kongwa was allotted 90,000 acres of which
31,000 acres were to be put under production but because of two suc-
cessive bad seasons, only 12,000 acres were cultivated in three years
( 19l9-195l). Urambo was also to have 90,000 acres which were to be
cleared in the next two years. There were two obstacles: first, famine
broke out in the region and so railway transport was diverted to trans-
',ing food instead of equipment; second, additional capital was needed
to attain this target. It was, therefore, decided to clear only 65,000
acres by 1950.^
For the Southern Province, the revised plan aimed at clearing 1^20,000
acres. Of these, 20,000 acres had to be cleared within the first season
ending in November, 1950, and the rest was to be completed by the end
of 195ii. The operation here, as can be seen from the number of acres,
was far larger than the other two regions combined. More money was
allocated for this area. Two large clearing teams were needed. Extensive
housing and servicing facilities were to be provided at an approximate
cost of Z 1,1400,000.
^The sources do not give the original amount of money allocated for
Urambo, and they do not indicate the additional amount that was needed.
3Overseas Food Corporation, The Future of the Overseas Food Cpr-
oration (London: 1950), pp. 1-13. hereafter cited as Grnd. 3125
(19*0).
—
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The work under the new plan (for the Southern Provinces) started
with the examination of the soil types around Maehingwea. A number of
difficulties were uncovered, a) It was found that not more than 150,000
acres around Nachingwea could be made available for agriculture because
of" unsuitability of some soils and nature of vegetation, b) Only small
fields of 1,000 acres each could be created and these were separated
from each other by natural drainage courses and fields unsuitable for
agriculture, c) The access to these fields and communication between
them was difficult. This called for a more expensive road construction
program than the original plan had provided, d) The nature of the soils
rendered them highly liable to soil erosion and this also called for
expensive soil protection measures to be taken, e) The cost of clearing
each acre was higher than the original plan had provided. f ) In 19h9 t
it had been estimated that the work would be done by five clearing teams
but by 19!?0, experience had shown that this was beyond the physical and
financial resources of O.F.C, It was therefore decided to limit the teams
to tero. Theoretically, these two teams would be capable of clearing
6o,000 acres a year.
The situation as described above necessitated a proposal for a
revised new plan for the Southern Provinces. It was suggested that the
only way of reducing costs of clearance was to substitute hand labour
for a part of the work being done by machinery. The substitution of
Wo figures are provided. The new plan does not even say what the
increase in cost was to be in figures. For further explanation see Ibid ,
Ibid.
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han . labour eliminated the leant efficient and most costly of the
mechanical operations
—
piling and stumping. Nevertheless, the labour
available for this work necessarily reduced the rate of progress to some
15,000-20,000 acres a year.
With regards to the entire revised plan, experience had shown: a)
there was a loss of 95,000 acres from the planned production at Kongwa
and Uraraboj b) not more than 15>0, 000 acres could be developed in the
ithern Province without the construction of another costly base of
operations 5 c) progress could not be achieved at the rate estimated,
and costs of development and land clearing especially in the Southern
Region were higher than had been estimated, which meant that the bor-
rowing capacity of the O.F.C. could not pay for the preparation cost
of the original 600,000 acres.
The O.F.C. made a further proposal. On the basis of the results
achieved, and the problems still unsolved, there was no reason to propose
an increase in the existing borrowing capacity. The only solution, it
was felt, was to devise another revised plan which could be executed
within the Z 50 millions of long term capital authorized by the Overseas
Resources Development Act of 19hQ,
When the Board reviewed the activities of the O.F.C. they recommended
the following points: a) The effort to produce crops on land which had
been prepared at a high cost in money and human effort should be maintained
Ibid . The situation would be more complicated if enough sums were
needed to meet the liabilities, all of them non-revenue earnings which
fell on the corporation because the scheme had been scaled down as oc
pared with that for which provision had been made in the attempt to
carry out the original plan.
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for period of (seven years) to indicate fairly conclusive results
j
b) The groundnuts yield had been quite good on the areas already selected
but this yield had been on experimental farms. What had to be done now
was to reproduce similar results or something close to them on a field
scale. But one problem here was realized ; the groundnut, being a plant
that does not lend itself readily to mass methods of cultivation over
vast areas, made the attainment of economic production, which demanded
wide farming, almost unworkable. This meant that the units should be
reduced. It was then decided that smaller farms of 1,^00 to 6,000 acres
should be separately worked by men who could acquire thorough knowledge
of certain peculiarities of land on their independent farms—peculiarities
that were assumed to differ from farm to farm.' c) Gutting down of forest
and bushes by mechanical means had also proven impossible within either
the period or the cost established in the previous plans. This should
be done at an economic cost in relation to the value of the arable land
already created. Simpler and slower methods must be employed partly to
reduce the costs. " d) Communications, installations, machines and man-
power had already been built up over the past three years-for a major
clearing in the Southern Province (that was due to start in December
195>0). It was thought that it would be wasteful not to make use of this
accumulation of resources at least for maximum tree cutting effort during
7
'Sources do not mention what these peculiarities were but they implied
that they would relate to soil fertility, erosion and how well or badly the
crops would flourish on various farms.
Q
Simpler and slower methods meant using hands instead of machinery.
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the coming wet season, e) ProTiflioni had to be made from the capital
which remained at the disposal of the O.F.C. to meet commitment. .
especially those that need to be discontinued, and to provide some re-
serve margin for the unforeseen possibilities which would inevitably
arise during the execution of any revised plan.
9
On the basis of the above recommendations, the O.F.C. developed
suggestions to attain, within their statutory borrowing power, the fol-
lowing wide range objectives. First, was to be established by the use
of agricultural practices and scientific experiments, a system of farm-
ing which would make use of all the cleared land and if successful would
lead to future development (preparation of more land.) Second, all the
cleared land was to be provided with adequate equipment
—
permanent in-
stallations, machinery and implements—without which the capital expen-
diture on the land clearing would be wasted. Third, the first stage of
what might become a plan to develop the total area (i.e., 1!?0, 00D acres)
was to be started in the Southern Provinces. This stage would extend to
195>7, serviced from Nachingwea, and would adequately make use of instal-
lations, machinery and manpower already at hand. 10 Fourth, all present
and future liabilities so far as they could be foreseen were to be pro-
vided for. And finally, a sense of permanence and stability without
which no constructive objective could be achieved efficiently was to be
created. -*•
9Ibid.
l°This was thought of as the most efficient and economical of the
mechanized operations.
1:LIbid.
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The estimates of costs and revenue had been provided for the first
three seasons only, that is to September 30, 195>3. The reason for this
was, the corporation considered it unrealistic to work out detailed esti-
mates of farm costs and predictions of crops, yields and prices over a
longer period than three years, or to anticipate the changes in farming
organization and technique and in crop rotations which might be the
results of current experiments at that time* However, they regarded an
assured future for agricultural production over a minimum period of seven
years as essential to ultimate success. If the British government ap-
peared unable to provide such an assurance the Q.F.C. would then regard
any further capital expenditure to be of doubtful justification.
Furthermore, annual reports and budgets ?70uld be submitted each year
based on a detailed appraisal of the progress of the Scheme. It should
be remembered that an attempt was being made to frame a new system of
farming in areas where farming, other than crude African agriculture,
TO
had not hitherto been attempted, **
The above plan, it was thought, provided for agricultural losses
and unforeseen contingencies. The O.F.C. considered that the costs as
they had been estimated could be reduced in time. As a result of their
investigations and the best advise they could get from experts, the O.F.G.
was satisfied that the prospects of success, and the advantages to African
development which would result from it, justified such risks as might be
involved in a seven-year commitment. They suggested therefore that such
a commitment be accepted by the government. They were aware that the new
12Ibid.
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plan could not in itself contribute importantly towards Britain's food
supplies. The area under crop during the three years would be no more
than as shown in the following table, and the best that could then be
hoped for within the borrowing capacity of the O.F.C. was 250,000 to
300,000 acres available for production in some form. -^
Table 3
Acreages Under Crop
Southern
Kongwa Urarabo Province Total
1950/51
1951/52
1952/53
About $0% of this acreage was expected to be covered by ground-
nuts, the rest being distributed among maize, sorghum and millet.
The Broad Outline of the Revised Flan
a) A provision was made for crop production on an acrea. e starting
at 6ij,65o acres in the year ending September 30, 1951, and rising to
8l,Ii50 acres by September 1953.
b) The land prepared for agriculture was to be equipped with the
installations, buildings, electricity, water supplies, plant, machinery,
vehicles and tools essential for agricultural production.
12,150 15,000 7,200 6h,o5o
12,1450 l5,ooo 16, 8oo 7)4,250
12,1j50 U5,ooo 2ii,000 81,1*50
13 Ibid.
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c) The resources already accumulated in Machingwea, the capital
of the Southern Province, were to be used for maximum tree felling
effort in the subsequent season. This should result in the clearance
of some liOjOOO acres, thereafter, i.e., from June, 195>1 to September,
195>7 j operations would be reduced to such yearly acreage as could be
achieved by a permanent force fixed at thirty tractors, helped by hand
labour. It was estimated that thirty tractors supplemented by hand
labour would provide for a balanced and unfira annual effort. And
about 15>,000 acres would be made available for agriculture annually by
using these methods,
d) Provision for commitments which arose from the reduction in
scale of the previous plan, which included guarantees given in respect
to port, railway and oil tank construction, breakages and maintenance
expenses and compensation to employees for loss of office.
e) Reserve provision for accumulated depreciation liabilities and
unforeseen contingencies.
The details of the plan will be explained on the regional basis
in the subsequent paragraphs. (For the estimates, see the schedule). 1^
*W
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Schedule I Capital Expenditure 5,960,000
Schedule II Provision to meet farming costs
to 30th September, 1953* includ-
ing all administrative overheads
and a depreciation provision for
all assets utilized, less antici-
pated revenue from crops 760,000
Schedule III irovision for past commitment 2,660,000
Accumulated depreciation to 31st
March 1951 370,000
Contingencies 1,000,000
10,750,000
Les^: The estimated net credits from
utilization and sale of surplus
stores and equipment 2,250,000
8,500,000
Add: Estimated expenditure to 31st
arch, 1951 36,500,000
Z U5, 000,000
The Overseas Resources Development Act of I9I48 had allowed the O.F.C,
long-term borrowing powers amounting to Z 50,000,000 plus Z 5,000,000
for short-term advances. It was therefore possible for the O.F.C. to
borrow a further Z 2,500,000 of long-term capital before the statutory
limit was reached. ^5
The execution of the plan was the next step, and as it will soon
be noted, it varied in the three regions—Kongwa, Urambo and Southern
hrovince.
1. Kongwa
The first thing the O.F.C. did was to abolish the Regional Head-
quarters. Then three large farms of 12,000, 6,000, and 3,000 acres
respectively were established. Each farm had a manager who was invested
^Ibid.
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with maximum authority and would be directly responsible to the new
General Manager. A fourth farm of about 1,500 acres was also established
under the control of the Scientific Department and the Operational Re-
search Unit. The purpose in laying out these farms was to conduct fully-
costed field scale trials for about three jears starting with the next
planting season in December, 195>0. Expansion to the remainder of the
cleared land depended on the success or failure of the already established
farms. To preserve the cleared area until the expansion was possible,
ranching on a small scale was gradually introduced.-^
2. Urambo
In the case of Urambo, clearing was reduced to 65,000 acres which
was to be completed during the 195>0 season. The O.F.C. thought that
some 50,000 acres would be completed by November and that it would re-
quire three to four months longer to clear the remaining 15,000 acres.
The amount of money that was required to equip Urambo for complete pro-
duction on some 60,000 acres (which excluded 5,000 acres required for
soil conservation works) was estimated at £ 1*10,000.
The land was reorganized into two main administrative units,
comprising:
Unit Ho. 1 — Six farms, ranging from 3,300 acres to 5,500 acres
with one of 1,700 acres, and
Unit No. 2 — Seven farms of 1,500 acres each and four of 5>000 acres.
16
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Each farm was re ar ed as a Bt If-contained and resp msible entity. The
cropping programme comprised groundnuts, maize, and sorghum, (See below
for estimates.) '
1950/51 1951/52 1952/53
lbs. lbs. lbs.
Groundnuts, Kernels 600 650 700
Maize 1,000 1,200 l,lioO
Sorghum 1,000 1,200 1,300
The money provided for Urambo as indicated in the plan had to cover
farming losses up to September, 1953. However, it was difficult to pre-
dict with accuracy what the results were going to be ov-=r so large a
new farm, or how long it was going to take before production over the
entire area became self-supporting. The success, it was thought, de-
pended on the amount of improvements that were to be made on these farms.
3. Southern Province
As already pointed out, not more than 150,000 acres of good land
was available in the Southern Province unless a new base of operations
was constructed. Two land clearing teams had been assembled. Since
mechanized land clearing was an expensive affair some hand labour had
to be used. But hand labour required a longer cycle of operations. The
O.F.C. found it necessary to put forth the following proposals: a ) an
all-out felling effort during the wet season of December, 1950 to April,
1951, using the resources available in Nachingwea; b) the reduction of
17
Ibid.
70
the mechanized effort as from June, 195l, to a force of thirty operational
tractors. The O.F.G. felt that things would work well by organizing a
compact and manageable mechanical force, helped by hand labour. This
force would be employed over a definite period of time of reasonable
length instead of working to a predetermined target of acreage. Greater
stability and coherence would be provided by this operation. It was
estimated that by the end of 1957 105,000 acres should be finished,
ready for agriculture and 35*000 to 1*5,000 should be in preparation.
By 19%k 9 it could be predicted whether it would be economically feasible
to complete the development of the 150,000 acres that were available.
This work would extend to i960 or 1961. It was estimated that £ 5,225,000
would be needed to meet the expense of a clearing programme, surveys,
soil conservation operations and necessary installations.
A special committee set up by the O.F.G. examined the agricultural
aspects for the region. The members of the committee included G. F.
Clay, Agricultural Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Frank Sykes, an experienced English farmer who was also interested in
African agriculture and was a member of the colonial Agricultural Ad-
visory Committee, and representatives from the Tanganyika government. '
The committee, after careful investigations based on observations and
discussions, came to the conclusions: that the Southern Region was
suitable for giving good yields of groundnuts; that maize growing could
Ibid
.
^The names of Tanganyika government representatives are not pro-
vided in the Cmd . 8125 (1950) from which most of this material was
obtained.
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also give good yields, but this remained to be proved; and that cotton
and tobacco were to be experimented -with and if successful, would improve
the economic outlook of the Scheme in this region.
On the other hand, two problems were foreseen. There would be the
serious farming problems in the future due to the difficulties of soil
management. These, however, could be overcome by sound farming methods.
Second, there were high demands for power and labour during the busy
planting season. This was likely to remain a permanent disadvantage to
the Scheme. However, the committee was optimistic as to the eventual
prospects and this could be a justification for the 0.F..C.'s procedures.
The farms in this region were laid out into 3,000 acres, each of which
2,h00 acres were to be in crops each year. In the coming season seven
farms were scheduled to be opened, but it was unlikely that more than
7,200 acres would be planted. It was worked out that about 105,000 acres
would be opened for agricultural purposes by the end of 1957. In three
years (1951-1953), groundnut yields were expected to have risen from
600 lbs. to 700 lbs., maize from 1000 lbs. to 1100 lbs., and millet,
no increase at all (600-600). 20
Administrative Centres (Centers)
The administration of the Scheme included the London office,
Nairobi offices and the East African headquarters. The London office
had a nearly complete staff of one hundred and seventy. Under the new
plan this number was to be reduced to about seventy by the end of 1953.
20Ibid.
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Nairobi, Kenya, was the trading and transport center for the whole of
East Africa. Since the Scheme had been reduced in scope, it was neces-
sary to keep a relatively small agency staff in Nairobi to take care
of local purchases and control the air transport contract that had been
entered into between O.F.C. and B.O.A.C. This reorganization left the
door open for bringing the agency under the control of the London office
at the end of the local decentralization process proposed in the new plan.
The Kongwa headquarters consisted of seventeen departments and a
staff of one hundred and fifty Europeans. It needed a minimal annual
budget of Z 270,000. This was quite expensive and plans were soon devised
to reduce the office by decentralization and abolition of some departments.
The process would be a gradual one and it was expected to be completed
by the end of 1953 after which the annual cost would be reduced to about
£ 1j0,000. The executive powers of the headquarters were to end by January,
195l, except in the field of finance. It was to be replaced by a group
of four advisors representing the agriculture, engineering, labour and
finance areas. These would be helped by seven assistants and an office
staff. More authority was given to two regional general managers—one
for the Central Region of Urambo and Kongwa and another for the Southern
Region. They would be directly responsible to the Board in London.
The advisors were given the right and the duty to advise the general
managers and the Board. At the same time they were to make or seek
reference to the Board at their discretion.
The disbandment of the Kongwa headquarters had several advantages.
One was that it left the O.F.C. with a surplus of buildings which it
would turn into storage and workshops. Second, the O.F.C. entered into
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discussion with the Tanganyika government so that the government could
use some of the buildings the O.F.C. could not use. Some of them were
turned into hospitals. Others were probably sold rather than rented to
the government providing an additional source of revenue f :>r the O.F.C. 21
The Staff
The O.F.C. also made changes in its staff, particularly the
European staff. The following table shows the number employed at
the time the new plan was devised and the subsequent annual reductions.
The numbers include, also those employed by the Earthmoving and Con-
struction Ltd. 22
Table h
Number of Employees
Present As at As at As at
Strength 30 '9/51 3C/9/52 30/9/53
778 609
The table shows that the reductions were drastic and severe. How-
ever, they were not more than was necessary if the Scheme was to be
brought within the bounds of finance which the revised plan required.
Severe disappointment and great personal hardships were certain to result
O.F.C. 1,233 838
E.G. 33U 30
1,667 918
22The Earthmoving and Construction Ltd. was a wholly-owned subsidiary
company of the O.F.C. which was eventually eliminated as the table shows.
The figures exclude the staff employed in the disposal of surplus plant,
stores and equipment.
Ik
from the course of executing these reductions. The O.F.C. arranged
compensation for its employees on their dismissal. This compensation
had to cover six months' salary plus the earned leave due to them.
This was the implementation of the statement made by the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Food in the House of Commons on the 17th
July, 1950. 23 The O.F.C. also included £ 1*00,000 to cover these liabili-
ties. The case of employees of E.C. was different. These employees
were hired on temporary contract terms and their case was to be dealt
with in accordance with the terms laid down in individual contracts.
The African staff—clerks, tract drivers, and mechanics—were re-
garded as skilled workers. After studying their employment opportunities
carefully, the O.F.C. decided to retain a large number of them within
the scope of the revised plan, particularly those who had improved in
their skills and competence. The demand for unskilled labour remained
high and even increased because of expansion in agriculture and sub-
stitution of land labour for machines in the land-clearing operations. ^
Yi/hy was there a greater reduction in European staff than in
African staff? First, it was not the general custom of the African
workers, especially unskilled, to remain in continuous employment and
as there was an ample demand for such labour throughout Tanganyika,
no hardship was expected to arise. Second, the African economic demands
were not as great as the European and so, the retaining of a large
2*5
^The name and statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the
iiinistry of Food were not given in the sources available. The Minister
for Food was John Strachey.
2ii
^Ibid.
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African staff did not present a serious financial problem.
Commitments and Reservea
1. Railway Guarantees
In 19U7 it has been decided to build a deep water port at Mtwara
with a railway to run to Nachingwea. Because of time needed to finish
the port and the first section of the railway to Ruo it was found neces-
sary to construct a temporary port at Mkwaya, close to Lindi (see map
on page 27) and connect it to the planned main line at Ruo. This was
intended to continue to Nachingwea and be ready for traffic by October,
19h9, The administration of the East African railways and harbours
had agreed to finance these constructions from the East African Transport
Loan, subject to guarantee from the Corporation of any shortness in
interest and a sinking fund not covered by the port and railway earnings.
The undertaking was reviewable after ten years. The guarantee was later
expanded to cover any deficiency that might arise in operation costs.
The port and railway construction was embarked upon on the basis of the
estimated amount of traffic, both ingoing and outgoing, which would have
resulted from carrying out the original plan.
The reduction of the original plan deprived these ports and railway
works of any chances of being of economic benefits on the O.F.C.'s traffic
alone. It ha-, already made clear to the Ministry of Food in London that
so far as their own requirements were concerned, the completion of the
Mtwara Port and the rail section from Mtwara to Ruo was unnecessary,
and that if for other reasons it was the wish of the government to
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proceed, the obligations of the O.F.C. should be restricted to its
inescapable liabilities as on, say the 31st December 195>0. ^
2. Shell Oil Company Guarantees
An oil pipeline had been constructed from Mtwara to a tank centre
in Nachingwea as a part of the entire Southern Region development. This
line was completed in 191*9. The Shell Company of East Africa Ltd. was
responsible for ocean installation at Mtwara into which oil tankers dis-
charged. It also handled installation at the inland terminal. The O.F.C.
agreed to pay the company depreciation and interest incurred over a five-
year period on the installations. This could only be paid if the amount
of oil going through the pipes fell short of an agreed figure of 100,000
tons over the period. This figure was substantially less than the esti-
mated consumption given to the company when the agreement was reached
with the O.F.C. 26
Under the reduced plan it was unlikely that the consumption would
exceed 5,000 tons yearly. Therefore, an additional account of £ 220,000
was set aside to cover a ten-year period for oil installations provided
by the Shell Company at both Kongwa and Urambo. '
-Ubid
. It was too early to assess correctly how much the liabilities
for the Corporation were going to be in respect to the railway guarantees.
However, £ 1,250,000 had been set aside for the purpose.
c Depreciation and interest were then paid because the figure fell
short and the company did not make profit on agreed figure of 100,000
tons.
27Ibid.
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3. Depreciation Expenses
Under the new plan the reduction in the s^ale of agricultural
operations at Kongwa for which roads, buildings, plant and a large
hospital and workshops had been provided necessitated maintenance and
operation expenditure on a scale which could not fairly be charged against
the farming of 12,000 acres only. It was, however, necessary to sustain
these installations in case the results over the next three years should
justify a subsequent expansion. To do so, a sum of E 295,000 was pro-
vided to cover the costs.
At Kongwa, Urambo, and Nachingwea the O.F.C. found itself in pos-
session of equipment and stores not required for the future operations.
It was also faced with special non-recurring expenses of the organiza-
tion. These costs could not be properly charged to the current expenses.
For this reason a provision of £ ii93>,000 was made to cover the costs.
The total amount set aside to meet the above expenditures and
compensation due to excessive staff was £ 2,660,000. This money was
expected to be recovered by surplus stores and equipment valued at
£ 2,250,000. A net provision for paying commitments arising from the
past was E 1410,000; £ 370,000 was reserved to cover the accrued de-
preciation on the assets on 31st March, 1951. This sum was required
for the revised plan. And again a sum of £ 1,000,000 was appropriated
to meet the unpredicted contingencies.
28ibid.
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h. Pending Problems
After presenting the revised plan and prescribing means for carrying
it out, the G.F.C. still found itself confronted with three sets of
problems, a) It was to get rid of the physical and contractual legacies
entered into in the past (in the original plan). This appeared crucial
and it was not expected to be over until after two years, b) A method
whereby the future activities of the O.F.C. would not be overloaded
with overhead representing the cost of present surpluses, whether of
stores, plant, installations, buildings or manpower, had to be devised.
This was basically a financial problem and was to be handled as such,
c ) Morale constituted the third problem. The new plan disposed of many
of the O.F.C. *s personnel. Compensation and help in securing employment
either in Tanganyika, or any other African country, or in England was
being given. But this did not restore the confidence of the remaining
employees in the security of their jobs. The restoration of such con-
fidence depended on the success or failure of the Scheme.
"
Conclusion
It has been noted that the development of a second plan came as a
result of the failure of the original plan. The reasons were many and
varied. First, it was too large a planj second, there were numerous
miscalculations in the estimates—financial, employees, transportation
facilities, and accomodation. But most important was the poor management •
29
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The new plan was therefore designed to correct these errors and to
avoid
further repetition of them.
Although there was a general pattern of the new plan, process of
reorganization was carried on on a regional basis—Kongwa, Urambo and
Southern Province—because each region presented its own particular
problems. Administrative centres, staff, commitments were examined.
However, more problems were still anticipated especially those relating
to contractual legacies, future overhead, and morale. At this point,
the success or the failure of the Scheme was difficult to predict because
the revised plan was in its infant stage. Success on experimental
farms
upon which the revised plan was based had been experienced and this gave
a feeling of optimism. On the other hand, the original plan had
failed
|
the new plan could also fail.
CHAPTER V
EMPLOTEES AND THEIR WELFARE
One of the objectives of the Groundnut Scheme was to provide
opportunities for soeial and economic advancement for the Africans
living in the areas selected. This was to work in accordance with
the general aims of the British colonial policy and the obligations
assumed by His Majesty's government under the United Nations Charter,
and, in the case of Tanganyika, under the Trusteeship Agreement that
had been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. To
this end the Africans employed by the Scheme would be encouraged to
accept responsibility for the management of their own social services,
and later to participate actively in the management of the agricultural,
commercial and industrial phases of the undertaking. The fact that
greater attention was to be paid to the welfare of African communities
in the areas did not mean that the welfare of Europeans was to be over-
looked. In this chapter the welfare of both races will be discussed.
The discussion will encompass personnel and labour, catering and shops,
education and social life, and finally health, in the years 19h3 and
19h9, since the years 19h6 and 19hl have already been discussed in
Chapters I and II.
1
Tanganyika was a German colony before the First World Warj as a
result of the war, Germany lost it. The British took over as a mandatory
territory. The Mandatory System was changed to the Trusteeship System
after the Second World War.
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Personnel and Labour
1. European Staff
As the Scheme unfolded, there was a substantial increase in the
number of European staff members both in London and in East Africa.
The London staff increased from 119 to 232 and the East African staff
more than doubled, increasing from IjiiO to 9^7. There was no shortage
in the number of applicants. Statistics showed that there were more than
19,^00 applicants every year, but analysis indicated that the O.F.C.
experienced difficulties in obtaining accountants, field surveyor",
engineering draftsmen and agricultural scientists. From the beginning,
there were fears that the Europeans would be unwilling to accept jobs
with the U.F.C., but as the Scheme progressed, this did not appear to
be true. During the year, there were sixty-one resignations, twenty
dismissals, and twenty-seven contracts were terminated. This did not
create a problem at all because replacements were available almost im-
mediately, due to the number of applications on the waiting list. The
economic benefits that were attached were responsible for the large
number of applicants. First, the salaries were very attractive; second,
provident funds and pension funds were started for those in East Africa;
and finally, the Superannuation Fund was introduced for those in London.
The Overseas Food Corporation, Report and Accounts for 19l*8-19b9 >
(London: 19h9), pp. 1-3, hereafter cited as Reports 19hQ-19h9 .
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2. African Labour
The African comprised a larger proportion of the labour force.
It was evident that the Scheme would be very dependent on the ability
to get the Africans to work. It was found that they showed tremendous
capacity and adaptability as drivers, maintenance men, operators of
agricultural and land-clearing equipment. They also demonstrated ability
in the simple mechanical work of repetitive nature. It was estimated in
the original plan that the peak of the native labour force would be
57,100. The size of this African labour force presented a unique problem
to the Scheme. It led to the formation of a special department. On the
other hand, no serious difficulties were encountered in the recruiting
process. On May 1, 19l|8, 6,81+li skilled Africans had been employed and
by April 1, 19h9 9 the number increased to 13,619.3 Bearing in mind
that the Scheme was started without African skilled workers, training
of Africans in various skills was one of the contributions to the
African people. Some of these people could not be expected to work
for the O.F.C. indefinitely if the Scheme vras to be successful. For
various reasons, they could resign and find work with other groups.
In so doing, they would not be required to undergo further training
before they were employed. Even the unskilled workers also had an
advantage. Their experience with the O.F.C. helped them to obtain
employment with other corporations.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
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problems Relating to "Skilled" Workers
The problems arising in this area were not of a quantitative but
of a qualitative nature. The labour exchange was becoming worse every-
day. The poorest performance was shown at Urambo. The greatest promise
was shown by the Luo and Wakamba tribesmen from Kenya and the Wasukuma
from Tanganyika. In general, the African skilled labour was relatively
lower than that of Asians and Europeans.
Furthermore, there were certain kinds of skilled workers that could
not be obtained among the Africans in East Africa, e.g., superior clerks
and technicians like generator and machine operators, refrigerator re-
pairmen, skilled mechanics and carpenters. There were many Indians in
East Africa, but they were not applicants for employment. The reason
for this is hard to ascertain, but the Indians in East Africa have de-
veloped greater interest in businesses of their own rather than in being
employed by either the government or private corporations. To supply
needed skilled workers, the Corporation imported about 200 Mauritians
and Seychelles. The chief suppliers of skilled African workers were
Kenya and Tanganyika. Applicants either came in person or filed written
applications. The Labour departments of Kenya and Tanganyika helped the
applicants follow the proper procedures. Little man power was drawn
from Uganda, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.''
Ibid.
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Unskilled Labour
The unskilled labour was plentiful in the three regions. There were
two major causes for this shortage: First, at that time (19h$-19k9)
the Africans living in the neighborhood grew enough food for themselves
and their families. They had also a surplus to sell; hence, they could
maintain themselves and pay their taxes without outside employment.
Of course, their demands were not many, but sooner or later, they were
expected to rise with a high influx of new foreign goods. Second, the
railway construction in this area involved strenuous manual work which
made it unpopular with the Africans. The railway labour shortage did
not remain constant. At certain times there was a food shortage re-
sulting from drought or destruction of the crops by insects like locusts
in African areas. This lessened the problem of railway labour because
the Africans were now forced to seek employment.
A major problem relating to African labour soon realized was its
poor utilisation. There were three main reasons for this. First, the
greater number of the Europeans who worked with Africans could not com-
municate easily with them. The only language through which they could
give instructions was Swahili, and since most of them neither spoke
nor wrote Swahili, they could not make themselves understood. Second
to the language problem was the dictatorial attitude demonstrated by
the European staff. Most of them were young and thought that they were
superior to native labourers and, thus had the right to expect obedience.
They, therefore, bullied the African workers, thus damaging the relations
between them and the Africans. Thirdly, there was no organized department
B5
to handle this problem of labour utilization until the arrival of
Colonel C. V. Merritt from Kenya at the end of March, 19^9.
The African Labour Turnover
The Africans showed up in numbers every month. The turnover averaged
about 10 per cent per month. The figure was excessively high. A worker,
unless he was under contract, could quit after collecting his first wage.
This was found to be the practice among the Africans who preferred to
cultivate their land before returning to work. Africans throughout
East Africa have, over a long period of time, developed a tendency to
regard any kind of job as temporary. Land was their security. So,
whenever a worker felt that his land was in danger of going back to
bush, he would leave the job or force his dismissal. Attempts to employ
African workers on contract in Kongwa Region failed because many did
not honour the contracts. The only practical way that succeeded was
to offer the Africans fairly good salary, good living and working con-
ditions for the men and their families.'
Wage Rates
In Tanganyika, as in other countries of East Africa, wages varied
in different sections. At this time there was not much demand among
Ibid., pp. h7-kQ. Colonel C. V. Merrit was a labour expert who
had had long experience by working with Africans in Kenya. He also
spoke Swahili very well and he could be understood by African workers
without difficulty.
7Ibid.
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African workers for salary increase. There were no active labour
unions to do this. Increases were made at the discretion of the
employer. The labour union movement became an active contending force
in the 1950s, when they began to advocate uniformity and increase in
wages. A worker in an urban center such as Nairobi Dar-es-Salaam vtrould
receive a higher wage than a worker in a town that was situated in a
remote part of the country. The O.F.C. offered wages corresponding to
those paid by the government of Tanganyika. In addition, the degree of
skill varied which in turn affected the wages paid. An attempt was
made not after very long to standardize rates of wages in the project.
This was done on the basis of categorizing trades into groups which were
also tested. A worker was, therefore, required to pass trade tests
before he was promoted. 'Wages of the unskilled workers were not
standardized. Wage rates were established on a regional basis and the
Corporation's Regional Managers had authority to adjust the wages as
they deemed necessary.
™
Procedure in Case of Grievance
The unskilled workers in East Africa liked their problems to be
discussed and settled in their presence rather than by reference. In
view of this, it was necessary to establish a committee where the
Africans could have their grievances voiced. Besides, some form of
machinery was necessary through which the Africans could settle their
personal affairs relating to marriage disputes, petty quarrels, as well
8Ibid.
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as participating in the management of community problems and recreational
pursuits. In realization of this, two kinds of councils, "domestic
councils" and "works committees" were created in all the regions. The
"domestic councils" were constituted of Africans. Their purpose was to
allow the Africans to organize their communal life. The primary functions
included solving domestic differences, improving the welfare of their
communities and mediating all cases concerning civil differences. They
worked in close collaboration with the African courts by sending to these
courts the matters that they could not settle for themselves.
Since these councils handled disputes that would otherwise be handled
by the government courts, they were formed in consultation with the
Tanganyika government. The councils worked very well and encoaraged
the European communities to take a keen int rest in the matters affecting
the African communities, thus creating an understanding atmosphere. More-
over, they gave the African an opportunity to learn to be responsible
for their own welfare.
The "works committees" were composed of appointed representatives
of management and elected employees. The main objective was to devise
a means of consultation between the administrative unit of the O.F.C.
and the employed. Their functions included: a) the attempt to foster
cooperation between units management and the employees, with the object
of achieving and increasing the efficiency and well-being of the employees;
b) the improvement of conditions of working for employees; c) to listen
and try to find settlement for grievances; d) to attend to physical
welfare at places of work; e) to try to collaborate with sports com-
mittees, welfare committees and domestic councils. Further to handling
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African affairs, there was the O.F.C. African Employees Committee in
Dar-es-Salaam whose functions were similar to those of the works com-
mittee.
Finally, and apart from these councils and committees related to
African affairs , there were also the Mauritian staff councils. They
were for migrant Mauritians workers whose affairs needed similar con-
siderations. For the Asians there were the O.F.C. and associated com-
panies, and Asian Employees Association, which later became a registered
trade union in Dar-es-Salaam.
Maintenance of Law and Order
A police force for the O.F.C. was organised primarily to sup-
plement the Tanganyika government police force. Some farms were situ-
ated in remote areas and property on these farms was open to theft and
malicious damage. More important still was the maintenance of law and
order among the employees. The Tanganyika government organized an
Auxiliary Police Force whose function was to patrol areas occupied by
the O.F.C. The O.F.C. provided the funds for the maintenance of this
auxiliary force. The chief officer was charged with the responsibilities
of reporting to the Governor and the Commissioner of Police in Dar-es-
Salaam. He was responsible to the Board of the O.F.C. for the protection
of its personnel and property. A police training school was started at
Ifunda to train constables.
9
Ibid.
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The following statistics show the effectiveness of the force in
discharging its duties.*
;or of Number of Number of Value of Value of
cases reported arrests convictions property stolen property recovered
728 5l8 h21 Shs. 137,516 Shs. 61,175
Caterin: and Shops
It has been the practice of many corporations in East Africa to
provide food and housing for their labourers. The O.F.C., though a
government organization, followed suit for its labourers who earned
Shs. liiO (about $20.00) or less per month. With the recommendations
of the Tanganyika government, the scale of the rations as authorized
by the Corporation's administration was as follows:
Maize Meal 2ii oz. per day
Beans h oz. "
Groundnuts 2 oz. " "
Sup,ar 8 oz. "
Meat or fish in lieu 2 lb. per week
Red Palm Oil 2 oz. "
Other vegetable oil ......... 2 oz. " "
Green leafy vegetables 2 lbs. " H
Salt it oz.
The reasons for providing such rations were psychological, health,
and transport. Psychologically, the O.F.G. wanted to improve the morale
of the workers and to demonstrate its interest in worker's welfare.
10Shs. 137,516 is approximately 19,6)46 U.S.A. dollars and Shs.
61,175 is approximately 8,7hO dollars. One dollar is about Shs. 7,000
of the East African money. See Ibid
., p. 50.
Ibid
., pp. 50-51. Maize meal in East Africa was and is still the
chief food for Africans. It was heavily supplemented by fresh beans,
meat, and green vegetables which were mainly fresh because there were
no refrigerating facilities.
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Regarding health, most of the labourers were uneducated and did not
know the correet diet for themselves and family. The departments of
health of the Tanganyika government and that of the O.F.C. worked to-
gether on the question of African health. Finally, since shops were not
situated within walking distance, the rationing practice had the objective
of saving time and energy for the labourers, since most of them could af-
ford neither cars nor bicycles.
In Kongwa, communal cooking directed by the Catering and Merchandise
Department was common. There were between twenty and one hundred fifty
messes established in different communities for both Europeans and
Africans. In Urambo there were five European messes opened but no
African messes were established so rationing took its place. Messes
were not organized in the Southern Provinces,
Towards the end of the year, research was conducted and it was
discussed that Africans rations had improved greatly. Tinned foods and
especially tinned meats were Introduced. Tinned meat was well liked
by the Africans who came to like it very well. Change in attitude
took some time. There were three reasons. First, Africans were not
and still are not used to eating tinned food. Because of the scarcity
of fresh food, it was necessary for them to learn to eat the tinned food
despite such superstitious beliefs that their women would become barren
if they ate such food. Second, there were no local canneries to process
12
No reasons are given why the Southern Province never organized
messes, but it is possible that money shortage was the major reason.
Another reason could be that Africans grew enough food in the area so
they really did not bother to spend money in the messes.
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tinned foods so that they could be available at any timej third, tinned
la were expensive and neither the O.F.C. nor the workers could afford
to buy it in bulk.
Shopping Facilities
The responsibility of the O.F.C. was to provide shops and stores
of various kinds. The O.F.C. controlled shops; later they were trans-
ferred to private ownership. The O.F.C,'? control was necessary because
these areas were very remote from big shopping centers like Dar-es-
Salaam, Tabora, Lindi and Dodoma, and it was difficult to induce private
individuals from these centers to establish trading centers in remote,
uninhabited areas. The O.F.C, itself had to take the initiative. But
as soon as the shops were transferred to private ownership, the O.F.C.
encouraged competition and discouraged monopoly. While in most East
African cities, the Indians play a leading role in shop ownership, there
are no indications that they took over shop ownership in the groundnut
areas in Tanganyika. The O.F.C. transferred the shops, through selling
them, to African and European private interests.^
Education and Social Life
The British government, when planning for the Scheme as early as
19b6, recognized that it would be objectionable to place the management
and the development of large areas of the African territories in East
Africa under the permanent control of an organization from outside the
13 Ibid., p. $2.
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territories. With this in mind, it was considered wise to make arrange-
merits with the territorial governments (Kenya, Tanganyika and Northern
Rhodesia) so that the undertaking could, at an appropriate time, be
transferred to them. This was envisaged as a step that would lead to
a more distant goal of handing over the control of the project to the
local t>eople themselves, preferably on a cooperative basis which would
insure the continuance of the benefits of large-scale mechanized and
scientific production. This ultimate objective would depend on the
availability of skilled and trained Africans for the efficient manage-
ment and operation of the project. For this purpose the Ifunda Training
Center had been established in 19k 8. It was located in a place owned
by the Tanganyika government in a remote area of the Southern Highlands
on the site of a former refugee camp.
The O.F.C. aimed at training 1,000 artisans every year—100 clerks,
25>0 civil engineering artisans, and 65>0 mechanical engineering artisans.
Besides, the center aimed at training men for auxiliary police service
and hospital and sanitary services. To run the center, about E 30,000
a year was needed. The candidates were supposed to have had standard
VI (grade VIII) education and would be in training by contract for four
years and then sent to various units for further training of 3 1/2 years.
The Tanganyika government was unable to supply an adequate number of
students so the center turned to getting more from Kenya, ^
Ibid.
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1. European Education
The arrival of a large European staff with their families created
an educational problem for both the government of Tanganyika and the
O.F.C. At that time there were no secondary schools in Tanganyika taking
European children. Kenya, however, was equipped with European schools
because it was settled by a large number of Europeans who built private
schools for themselves. Tanganyika on the other hand had only a handful
of Europeans, most of them government officials whose children were
sent to Kenya schools at the expense of the government. Kenya schools
were expensive and the O.F.C.'s European staff could not afford to send
their children to them. ^
To solve this problem, the O.F.C. started to build, equip, staff,
and administer schools at Kongwa and (Jrambo. The government of Tanganyika
agreed to pay 100$ of the current expenses of these schools. The first
school was opened on October 1, 19b8, at Kongwa with teachers recruited
from England. The 19li8-19li9 report shows that the number of children
attending these schools rose from 30 to 120 in a period of six months.
In the Southern Province, some children studied by correspondence, but
parents were encouraged to send their children to Government Primary
Boarding Schools where they could apply for remission of fees or
bursaries.
^Ibid.
l6
Ibid.
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2. African Education
The establishment of African schools in groundnut areas depended
on stabilization which in turn depended on the arrival of a sufficient
number of families when villages were built. Urambo had the first
housing program and so it had the first African school. At Kongwa,
a community center was started ?«?here lectures were delivered to the
English speaking Africans on subjects they chose themselves. The
favorite subjects were advanced English, political science, agriculture,
and art. Each evening the educated Africans became volunteer teachers
of other Africans who were eager to learn English, arithmetic, reading
and writing. ' Each member paid l£ s. a year and each class student
paid 3 s.^ These fees were low.
The Tanganyika government assumed the responsibility of paying 90%
of salaries and issued grants for building the O.F.C.'s schools. The
government schools were free, but in all O.F.G. schools Africans had
to pay fees. The fee-paying system in the British colonies was intro-
duced by reducing the fees as a child passed on to higher grades until
school became free. For example, the total fees in secondary schools in
Kenya in ±9hQ-19h9 were about Shs. 2f?0 and decreased from that amount.
Teacher training colleges charged no fee. The fees were accessed ac-
cording to the father's wealth. This was really an inaccurate method
17
Ibid
.
l£ s. is about $2.00 whereas 3 s. is about $ .50.
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because it was difficult to find out exactly how many head of cattle
or how many chickens a person had. It was also difficult to know how
much land he owned because land ownership was not registered.
In summary, the African schools were planned to give four years of
practical education in handwork, farming, hygiene and general improvement
of the home and village life.
Welfare
The Education and Social elfare Deparment of the O.F.C. made an
investigation of the entire welfare of the African community. The ground-
nut areas were remote and the surrounding African communities had not
received much attention from the Tanganyika government. The examination
of necessary programs in these areas, one could point out, was one of
the contributions of the Scheme to the entire country of Tanganyika.
It was also something that the British government would be credited for
by the rest of the world in its colonial development policy. In May
I9I48, it submitted a report to the Board. The report stressed, "that
the separation of welfare from general management was wrong in principle
19
and socially harmful in practice." Upon the recommendations made in
the re/ort and with the agreement of the Board, the following conclusions
were arrived at: 1) welfare of the people must be the responsibility
of the management, 2) there should not be a chief welfare officer. The
heads of departments and users of the African labour did not successfully
apply this basic principle and failure led to the intervention of the
19Ibid., p. 53.
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Central Management with the introduction of supervisory teams in all
departments.
A Women's Voluntary Service was created. This important organi-
zation sent out teams to Dar-es~Salaam, Kongwa, and Urambo to help the
arriving families of the workers. Their duties included preparations
for the families' arrival, providing information, acting as escorts,
and visiting families. *"u
Social life in general was organised by the members of their staffs.
The O.F.C. supplied capital equipment—club houses, tennis courts, open-
air cinemas and football fields. All these were available to the staffs
to operate. The clubs held weekly dances, gave gramophone recitals,
and offered indoor games. Army entertaining unit was responsible for
cinema performances, and showings took place not less than once a week.
By 19h6, when the Scheme was initiated by the United Africa Company,
a considerable number of Africans had been converted to Christianity. In
19li8, Christian missions were extended to groundnut regions. Among the
churches that attempted to meet the spiritual needs of the people in
these areas were the Church Missionary Society (known as the Anglican
Church) the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, and the Roman
Catholic Church. The staff participated by subscribing money to build
more churches and provide for their upkeep. Some Africans became Sunday
School teachers and Catechists. At Urambo the Moravian Church made
frequent contacts ?/ith African Christians and at Ifunda, the Swedish
Church assumed similar responsibilities.
20Ibid.
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Finally, to educate and inform the employees of the O.F.C, the
information division of the O.F.C. published several papers and journals.
Among them were the "Kongwa Daily News," a monthly journal of the O.F.C.
entitled "Our "orId," and a Swahili monthly paper, r, tVatangulizi." CJ-
Health
One of the problems which faced the O.F.C. was that of maintaining
the health of its employees. Careful attention was paid to services for
preventing and dealing with various diseases. The Africans were already
used to some tropical diseases like Malaria, but for Europeans such
diseases were usually fatal. Generally, for the last three 3rear? the
Scheme war? in operation, the health of both the Europeans and Africans
,^ood, although there had been outbreaks of epidemics like typhoid
fever and amoebic dysentery. None were reported to be serious. The
areas selected for the Scheme were insect infested
—
particularly with
mosquitoes and tsetse flies—but because of the use of modern insecti-
cides, the amount of sickness that might have resulted from these in-
sects was reduced.
Health service was divided into two sections: preventive medicine
and treatment of diseases.
Preventive medicine was the first responsibility of the health
service. The endeavour was to prevent illness in spite of the risks
21
The newspapers in contributing to social life also aroused social
consciousness whereby different African tribal groups and racial groups
came together as human beings living together as groups whose dealings
affected each other.
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to which the employees were exposed. In each region there was a
Regional Health Officer or Medical Officer of Health charged with the
duties of advising Regional Managers on health matter? outside the
hospitals; he carried out preventive medicine measures such as vac-
cination against small pox, chicken pox and measles, and supervised
and controlled unit health centers within the region. 22
The size of the staff of the Regional Health Officer was determined
by the health problems in each region, Normally, it consisted of British
Health Inspectors and Health Visitors responsible for the supervision
of all technical preventive medicine measures. Such measures as malaria
control, tsetse fly control, and inspections were placed under their
supervision. Together with them were the African Health Assistants
concerned with African dwelling quarters, sanitation, water supply and
spraying duties. 3
Diseases
During the year 19kQ-19k9 9 a number of diseases were most common.
Living conditions and general sanitation were not very satisfactory,
but because of preventive medicine services no considerable outbreak
of any of the diseases occurred. In Kongwa for example, two cases of
typhoid, one in an Asian and another in an African were reported in
April, 19h8, and fourteen cases among Africans were reported in August.
Wo further serious cases occurred. Kongwa also suffered an outbreak of
minor infections. Three hundred cases of chicken pox and two hundred
22Ibid
., pp. 5h-$$.
23 Ibid.
and fifty of mumps were reported among Africans, especially children.
The most fatal and is still so among Africans in East Africa as
a -whole is pneumonia. It kills a person within a short time if im-
mediate treatment is not taken. Malaria la very common too, but is
not as fatal as pneumonia. Africans it seem? are more resistant to it
than Europeans and so, some do not care for treatment at all. (See
graph on page 103
.
)
Hospitals
Equally important to the preventive medicine service in groundnut
\ons was the care of the sick and the injured. The O.F.C. had dif-
ficulties in providing enough hospitals within a short time. The few
that were in existence were supplemented by tents. By April 1, 19U8,
there were three hospitals built at Kongwa, Urambo, and Nachingwea in
the Southern Province. Two more were added at Mkwaya and Ifunda, and
by March 1, 19^9 they were ready for use. The following table shows
the number of hospital beds available by March 1, 19l9.
More than eight hundred people applied for treatment in the first
week, and Kongwa hospital treated about Ij25> patients per week. The
hospitals also treated people who were not employees of the O.F.C.
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2itIbid.
Ibid., p. 153. They show the beds already equipped. Accomodation
was completed for a total of 930 beds in all Groundnut Scheme areas. In
i'arch, 19ii9, a new hospital was completed at Kongwa and had better con-
ditions for protracted illnes,, serious operations and nursing.
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Table 5
Number of Hospital Beds
Hospital European Non-European Total
Kongwa I46 260 306
Urambo 12 Ilk 126
Nachingwea 26 96 122
Mkwaya 2k 76 100
Ifunda 8 30 38
Total 116 576 692
The staff consisted of European doctors, nurses (sisters) and
technicians helped by African orderlies. Few Africans would qualify
as doctors or nurses. Those that were available in the country were
employed by the government in government hospitals. The hospitals had
also surgical and medical specialists, pathologists and ophthalmologists.
At the end of 19ii9 the European staff had increased from 50 to 101 as
hospital admission rates increased. (See Table 6)^6
Table 6
Admission Rates Per 1,000
(per li-week month)
19li9 January February March
Eur. Afr. Others Eur. Afr. Others Eur. Afr. Others
Kongwa hO.O I4O.6 Uii.O 23.6 31.6 16.0 20.7 33.8 I48.O
Urambo 99.0 8U.0 102.0 60.0 iih.it 136.0 5U»0 i£.2 172.0
Machingwea 13ii.O 26.8 — IOI4.O 23.
£
— 100.0 13.3
Mkwaya 67.8 i*3.8 — 70.2 39.5 — 33.5 it3.5 —
Ifunda 9.1 53.0 — 3.0 h9.8 — 20.0 30.0 —
Total
Admission 126.0 111j9.0 17.0 95.0 8I16.O 12.0 89. 338.0 23.0
Actual figures
26Ibid.
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The high hospital admission and its effectiveness was also one of
the major benefits the East Africans obtained from the work of O.F.C.
This was so in the sense that the O.F.C. was nob just interested in
money-making but also in teaching the African community the benefits
they would get from hospitals. This affected a change from use of
native medicine to European medicine and removed a principal obstacle
to African progress. The subsequent table indicates how rapidly this
change took place.''
Table 7
Admissions and Out-Patients
(April 1, 19U8 to March 31, 19h9)
Kongwa Nachingwea Urambo Mkwaya Ifunda Totals
Admission
(European) U9U 215 279 135 17 l,3JbO
Admission
(Non-European) 7,921 753 3,370 677 270 12,991
Attendances
(European) ii,328 1,230 1,102 1,601 315 8,606
Attendances
(Non-European) 96,663 22,503 lh,063 22,91k 9,099 165,217
Medical standards in East Africa by late 19h0s were not high enough.
The O.F.C. in cooperation with the Tanganyika Department of Health worked
to improve standards. One may add that in the O.F.C. hospital the mortality
rate was greatly reduced, especially that resulting from pneumonia and
dysentery. In May, 19h9 for example, there were 23.6 deaths per 1,000
resulting from pneumonia, none from malaria, 21.7 from bacillary dysentery
and none from amoebic dysentery. Incidents of tuberculosis and enteric
27Ibid.
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fever remained comparatively high
—37^.0 and 92.0 respectively. Medical
services in the territories of the O.F.C, in East Africa were extensive.
Government and church hospitals had to improve their standards to equal
those of the O.F.C. 28
Additional services introduced by the O.F.C. to sustain high medical
standards included: ophthalmic, dental and X-ray. Although there was a
shortage of qualified men, the few that were available in bigger centres
visited other areas frequently. For instance, one ophthalmologist was
stationed at Kongwa and visited other areas monthly. According to his
reports, no ophthalmic disease of African origin had been found in any
European by March 1, 19ii9. Among those diseases common among Africans
and Asians were purulent conjunctivitis and trachoma.
Most injuries resulted from flying metallic splinters while working
in shops and from pricking by sharp thorns when clearing the brush.
Tractor drivers were the usual victims of thorn pricking. Thirty-three
ophthalmic operations were reported.
"
For dental services, the O.F.C. had only two surgeons. One was
situated at Kongwa and visited Urambo and Ifunda frequently; another was
at Nachingwea and visited Mkwaya. A dental laboratory was built at
Kongwa and. was directed by a European dental technician.
OR
For additional information see added chart from Ibid., p. iSh.
29
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HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS
January to March, 1949
J^p Common Diseases
EUROPEAN §§§§|§
AFRICAN
<<(*;
154
1,738 1,300 3,088
778 2 781
232 12 nhk
112 16^ 277
371 1,017 1,388
61 7 68
So 3 53
10lt
The table below shows the performances of O.F.C. dentists for three
months at Kongwa in 19h9 and one year's work at Machingwea.-^
Table 8
Dentist Performance
Europeans Africans Total
1. Attendance for examination
and/or treatment
2. Filling (amalgam, cement)
3 . Scaling
It. Gum treatment
5. Extraction
6. Denture construction
7. Denture repair
There is one Interesting point that can be brought out from these
figures. A high degree of filling among the Europeans was probably a
result of eating excessive sweet foods. In contrast, there were many
cases of extraction and gum treatment among Africans. In addition,
the high number of African dental cases indicated the degree of
African responsiveness to dental services—services that had been
uncommon in most African communities in East Africa.
By 19k9> the "X-ray services" were still uncommon in remote parts
of East Africa. The only places one would find them were big government
hospitals in big cities such as Nairobi, Kisumu, and Dar-es-Salaam.
The O.F.C. deserves credit for introducing these services in remote
areas. It employed two radiographers to begin with. One was in charge
of the X-ray department at Kongwa and the second at Nachingwea. The
30ibid.
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entire 19h9 work is shown below.
^
1. Case Returns: 2. Case Analysis
Europeans 1,055 Bones and Joints 1,253
Non-Europeans i,5o5 Chest and Heart 838
Total 2,#>0 Genito, urinary tract 96
Gastro-Intestinal tract 39
Dental 353
Sinus 39
Choleyc; to;raphies 9
Foreign bodies h
Others h
Total 2,63*
Separate figures were not given for Kongwa and Nachingwea.
Special Surveys Carried Out in Tanganyika
The O.F.C. did not restrict its surveys and research to its areas
of operation—Kongwa, Urambo and Southern Province. It felt that its
medical efficiency depended on health conditions in various communities
in entire Tanganyika Territory. For this reason, therefore, it decided
to extend its surveys throughout Tanganyika.
The first survey was carried on tuberculosis incidents. It took
place in March and April, 19^9, among all tribes in the Kongwa Region.
Dr. Rosemary Jackson, a colonial medical research worker employed by
the Tanganyika government helped conduct the survey. The incidence of
tuberculosis was found to be high. Of the 216 persons examined, 6q%
showed a positive reaction and only \\Q% were negative.™ (See Table 9.)
31t ia
32
Jbid., 157.
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Table 9
Tuberculosis Incidents
Total Number Percentage Percentage
Examined Positive Negative
All tribes 216 60 1*0
Wagogo (all ages) 112 38 62
Wagogo (adults) 92 li3 57
Wagogo (children) 20 15 85
Other tribes 10l| 8U 16
The figures indicate that the Wagogo tribe when removed from their
natural environment and placed in crowded camps together with other tribes
would be in a relatively insecure position.
The Importance of this survey was difficult to assess because similar
surveys were not carried on in other tribes.
However, the Wagogo were studied in their natural surroundings and
the figures included those of the employed and the unemployed of the
Kongwa village. It could be assumed that the figures helped determine
to what degree the Wagogo were sensitive to tubercule bacillus.
Second, was the "nutritional" survey. There were complaints arising
from hospital staff that employees were on an inadequate and poor quality
diet. As a result, a survey was made on October 20, 19U8. The results
indicated that there was neither an inadequate or poor diet. Fifty
employees were used for the survey and compared with the previous sur-
vey taken at Kongwa j the condition of their skin was good, there were
no cases of "phrynoderma,"-^ one case of "cheilosis, "3k and two cases
"*2phrynoderma: a skin eruption resulting from fitamin A deficiency.
^Cheilosis: cracks at the angles of the mouth and of the lips
resulting from riboflavin (one of the B vitamins) deficiency.
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of "Bitot's spots. "35
Finally, there were cases involving operations. By December 31,
19h8, 2h,739 procedures had been attempted in Kongwa Region, 7,£8U in
Urambo, and b,809 in the Southern irovince. In addition, there were many-
surgical cases. For the year ending March 31, 19h9, there were 721 cases
of "Trauma"-' including 105 fractures, 1,25>5> of non-trauma including 7h6
"septic infections, "3' 2,lh3 of surgical operations including 1,828
general (major or minor) and 272 orthopaedic. There were 1276 cases
of anaesthesia. 3"
Conclusion
Realizing that the Scheme was operating in areas that had been
uninhabited and with conditions unfavorable to human life, it is easy
to say that it was a difficult task to establish the employee facilities.
When one looks at the educational, social and medical services that had
been established by the end of 19^9, it can be concluded that one of the
objectives was close to being achieved. The statistical tables give a
35
Bitot's Spots: shiny triangular spots on the conjunctiva, also
associated with Vitamin A deficiency.
?6
Trauma: an injury or wound violently produced.
37 Septic infections: arise from poisoning caused by absorption
into the blood of pathogenic microorganisms.
38
Anaesthesia: comes from anesthesia which is a total or partial
loss of the sense of pain, temperature or touch produced by a disease.
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clear picture of the efficiency and extent to which the O.F.C. attempted
to carry out its work. Furthermore, the O.F.C. can be credited for a
high sense of responsibility for the needs of all races, European,
African and Asian, in the regions.
The uncertainty of oils being produced placed the welfare services
in jeopardy. Had the primary objective of the Scheme been accomplished,
the O.F.C. would have made a permanent contribution to the welfare of
East Africans,
CHAPTI-R VI
FINANCE AND ACCOUNTS
The Groundnut Scheme was an enormous agricultural adventure re-
quiring the utilization of the newest technical facilities in order to
produce something in those remote and undeveloped regions of Tropical
Africa. There were many risks involved, but the financial ones were the
most serious because nothing could be done without enough capital.
Nevertheless, the purpose for which the Scheme was undertaken justified
those risks. In this chapter we will look into the financial position
of the Scheme after it had been in operation for two years (19li6-19li7).
.hen th-3 O.7.C. t:>ok control of the Scheme from the United Africa
Company early in April, 19li8, over Z 7,000,000 had already been spent,
and the expenditure was still increasing at a rapid rate. 1 The financial
demands were so heavy that the Accounting Department found itself becoming
insolvent. This situation "•- lied for an immediate review. It became
evident that several actions should be taken. These included the
establishment of:
a) A proper account system capable of providing the
Regional Managers, the Central Management in East Africa,
and the board in London with the accounting information
required for the administration of the Corporation, b) A
staff of good quality and ability in adequate numbers to
do the accumulated work and the current work, to introduce
the new accounts system, and to insure its continued ef-
ficient operation, c) An internal Audit Department should
The original sum of money voted to start the entire Scheme was
Z 3,000,000 to clear 2,^00,000 acres. By I9I48 Z 7,000,000 had been
nt, and the target had not been achieved.
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be set up whose main function in the early stages would
be to audit the contractor's books and control their ex-
penditures, and d) to set up a financial control of ex-
penditure
.
2
The Accounts
These can be discussed at three levels: the East African accounts,
the London accounts, and the audit. The East African accounts had been
investigated in July, 19h7, by the Cooper Brothers & Go. Chartered Ac-
countants.-' Their recommendations were submitted in February, 19U8.
Because of shortage of staff, their recommendations could not be imple-
mented immediately. The major portion of the recommendations required
decentralized accounting organizations to be set up in each region in-
stead of having one central one in East Africa. This shortage also made
recruitment of accountants slow. It was only towards the end of 191*8
that some qualified personnel began to appear in East Africa. Meanwhile,
it was decided to centralize the regional accounts and to postpone adopt-
ing the recommendations of Cooper Brothers*4 so that they could be
2Reports 19lt8-19h9 , P. 59.
3Cooper Brothers & Co. was a company that was periodically contracted
to audit the O.F.C.'s accounts. No information has been obtained on
whether it was operating entirely in East Africa or whether it was one
of the companies in England and had branches in East Africa. Most com-
panies, however, operated both in England and East Africa, which might
have been the case with Cooper Brothers.
^The details of the Cooper Brothers recommendations are not given.
Therefore, it is difficult to determine how they compared or contrasted
with those of the O.F.C. which took control in April, 19h8, two months
after the Cooper Brothers had been submitted. Again, to whom these
Cooper Brothers recommendations were submitted, sources do not say.
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incorporated in those of the O.F.C. as soon as it had taken over.
In London a newly organized accounts department was created. Failure
to develop such a department before this was not due to any omission on
the part of the Managing Agency, but to the fact that during their control
the bulk of accounting work was done for them by the United Africa Company
Limited, the organization that initiated the Scheme.
In addition the O.F.C. found that no internal audit department had
existed in East Africa. The Internal Audit Division of the Ministry of
Food in London had been auditing for the Managing Agency of the O.F.C.
until February 29, 191*8. In planning to set up an audit department,
therefore, the O.F.C. encountered difficulties in recruiting which de-
layed its creation until September I9I48. The main function of this
Audit Department was to audit the contractor's accounts and to insure
sound supervision of their expenditures. The department was to be
generally responsible to the controller of the O.F.C. f s funds in East
Africa. At the same time the Chief Internal Auditor was to have an
access to the Board in London through sending it copies of his reports.
Financial Control
It was one of the policies of the O.F.C. to control its finances
through a budgetary system sanctioned by the Board in London. The system
could only work better if accounts were organized and capable of producing
comprehensive returns of the actual expenditure. Before the system was
effected, one of the preliminary steps in reorganizing was to have a rough
estimate of future accounts. For this purpose budget offices had already
been opened in both London and East Africa. They were charged with the
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responsibility of preparing financial estimates of the O.F.C. Additional
responsibilities included the production of financial plans through which
major items could be carefully examined. The budget office in London was
set up in April, I9lt3, and that in East Africa in May, 19l|8.
Before 19hQ, East Africa had depended on receiving financial direction
and advice from the Board and London office. In reorganizing, the O.F.C.
thought it as convenient to have an officer in East Africa at the manage-
ment level to handle the many and frequent financial questions which had
been previously referred to London. This step led to the creation of the
post of controller which made a part of the Central Management in East
Africa
.
Next, it was necessary to test the entire reorganization plan.
Early in 19^9 a budget was worked out for the financial year ending
March 31, 19h9j and it received the approval of the Board. It was put
into effect on April 1, 19^9 , until March 31, 19f?0, during which time
the new accounting system should demonstrate its success or failure.
The report covering the period pointed out that there were certain old
defects still persisting. The accountants were still concerned with
preparing the balance sheet and working on the accounts of the previous
year, leaving the current account to fall into arrears. By October, 19h9 f
it was obvious that something had to be done to remedy the situation,
particularly as it related to store accounts.^
The first step was to strengthen the staff and increase its ef-
ficiency. Arrivals from London in December, 19ii9 enlarged the clerical
5
Store accounts meant keeping of accurate records of stores as they
came and issued (equipments).
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staff. The expansion of qualified supervisory staff did not take place
until the end of 195>0. The employment of qualified men was planned on
a Ion -tem basis. The tfetSTB. Cooper Brothers and Co., in realizing
this problem, were very coop*native. They dispatched a team of seven
trained men from London to advise the O.F.C, on how to have the accounting
work done. The team arrived in East Africa in December, 19b9.
Moreover, the O.F.C. was interested in looking into the nature and
the scope of the pending work. The study was quickly conducted and a
report drawn up. The report showed that the work would be over by
January, 195*0. The report also revealed that the crucial arrears of
work were related to : first, the accounting by quantity and value in
terms of shipment, receipts and issue of stores, and second, the accounting
records and practice in the control of all kinds of capital assets and
equipment. The chief weakness was due to the lack of an extensive and
up-to-date pricing on stores. This made the recording of accounts of
the values of receipts and issues of stores unworkable. These corrections
were concerned with the current year (l9li9-19S>0), but not the subsequent
year (19i?0-19!?l). Something had to be done in order to assure that this
new year started without major deficiencies which would affect the func-
tioning of the Scheme. To this end the Board put out instructions out-
lining the procedure to be followed. They included a sound chain of
responsibility for the East African accounts, arrangement to be made to
insure that everybody understood the system, the expenditure drawn up
within budget limits, and budget forms and procedures set up and followed.
6Ibid., p. 60.
And again, disbursing officers were given sufficient financial powers
in order to control payments. Reports on returns were to be submitted
to the Board for scrutiny and further suggestions.'
The above orders issued by the Board in London were supplemented by
further steps to be followed in the form of accounts and accounting pro-
cedures. First, the accounts were to be decentralized to regions starting
from the first of April, 195>0. This step enabled the Central Accounting
Office in Dar-es-Salaara to devote its extra time on clearing and closing
the accounts of 19h9-195o, (This meant that the 195>0-19£l accounts were
now being cared for by the regions. ) Second, the 195>0-£l budget was
prepared with close attention to actual resources likely to be available
for land-clearing or other types of work. There was no assumption that
this budget was to have a high degree of accuracy to be applied in the
future budgets. It was to be as flexible as possible and open to changes
as would be deemed necessary. Third, a revised price list on stores was
produced. It covered 218 sections in which there were about 120,000 items
of stores. This was also revisable.
While the 1950-5>1 accounts were prepared with maximum care, they
were not expected to be perfect. Their purpose was to open a way for
further improvements and to place the financial and store accounts on a
fairly firm footing as the Scheme developed. It was not possible to
include cost accounts in the new system immediately, but as time went
on, this was to be included to cover some of the major activities of
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
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the O.F.C. T'is was one of the reasons why the system was open to future
chMX . Furthermore, it was necessary to set up some form of financial
control. The subsequent tables clarify how this was organized.
°
Table 10
Financial Control on March 31, 1950
(net cash position)
1. Expenditure on the East African Groundnut Scheme 30,009,809
2. Advances to Queensland British Food Corporation 991,200
3. Advances to East African Railways and Harbours
Administration l,952,99h
h. Balances at Bankers and Cash on Hand 695,997
5. Total Advances from the Minister of Food to
31st March, 1950 Z 33,650,000
At the same time budget estimates of cash expenditure were submitted
to the Minister of Food. This amounted to £ 12,600,000. Net cash expen-
diture against these estimates amounted to Z 12,076,000 and it ran as
indicated below:
^
Table 11
Net Cash Expenditure
Estimates Actual
Expenditure on East African Groundnut
Scheme 10,126,000 10,202,535
Advances Queensland-British Food
Corporation 600,000 J73,600
Advances to East African Railways and
Harbours Administration 650,000 999,865
Contingency Reserve l,22h,OQO —
Z 12,600,000 Z 12,076,000
-
..-
-/id
.
10ibid.
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Budgetary control, as it should be remembered, was not affected
immediately. It was postponed until the accounts organization was in
the position of coming out with item to item returns of actual expen-
diture. The 19h9-19£l report showed that the position was arrived at
early in April. Moreover, the current accounts were not satisfactory.
Financial control was, therefore, carried for this specific purpose of
examining carefully single items of expenditure and establishments. It
worked well on the whole, but it was not adopted as a permanent system
of financial administration.
Conclusion
When the financial review was carried, it had been discovered that
one of the factors that led to the poor functioning of the Scheme was
poor financial management. Much money had been spent without good re-
sults. For this reason therefore, stringent accounting, auditing and
budget system was a must to avoid further mismanagement. As already
noted, this was done by the introduction of a proper account system
responsible for providing Regional Manager, Central management in East
Africa, and the Board in London with all information relating to
finances; a staff of good quality and ability and the establishment of
internal audit department. A financial control system was also set up
but it must be remembered that during the first part of the year, not
much progress was made. It was a period when the new staff vrere just
getting adjusted. However, some improvement appeared during the second
part of the year leading to a substantial amount of control. Frequent
supervision was in process, care was taken to stop further local arrears
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of work appearing, and care of machines was improved in order to save
money that was spent on repairs. All these depended on enough supervisory-
staff which was difficult to keep constant, but those present showed their
capability in what they were doing.
CHAPTER VII
A PERIOD OP CONTROVERSY I9h9-I9$l
By the middle of 19^0, the Groundnut Scheme was in its fifth year.
During the first two years (I9l|6-19li7) it was under the management of
the United Africa Company. The O.F.C. took over in l°li8. The year
19l*9-195>0 can be looked at as the period in which the success or the
failure of the new plan might be realized. In fact, the year was a
disappointing and discouraging one. It ?ras not a result of the improper
functioning of the new plan, but of certain uncontrollable factors. In
19h9 9 the regions were hit by severe drought. Famine broke out in the
country which obligated the O.F.C. to turn its attention to famine relief.
Railways and road transportation facilities were diverted from carrying
equipment for the Scheme to carrying food supplies.
Again in 19li9-195>0 it was learned that there were fundamental dif-
ferences between the three regions—Kongwa, Urambo and Southern Province.
The differences appeared in the effect of topography and rainfall on
,
soil conservation. A fine example to illustrate this was the sloping
nature of many parts of the Southern Province as compared to more level
ground of the Kongwa and Urambo regions. Other differences noted included
the delay of the rain season at Kongwa, delay in removal of stumps and
levelling at Urambo, and shortage of suitable equipment in the Southern
Province. All of these factors caused a difference in the number of acres
cleared and planted.
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The following figures show the differences and clarify how slow the
progress was during the 19h9-50 period: 1
Table 12
Differences in Acreage
Region Acreage Aimed At Acreage Planted
Kongwa
Urambo
Southern irovine e
Total
80,000
20,000
2,000
102,000
70,500
13,000
1,^00
"HU7900
The shortage was 17,100 acres in all. This was not very encouraging.
The following is the acreage of crops planted in each region during
the year 19h 9-1950. (The analysis by crops): 2
Table 13
Difference in Crops
Crop Region
Kongwa Urambo
Southern
irovince Totals
Groundnut
Sunflower
Maize
Sorghum
Safflower
Totals
9,600 2,700 250 12,550
56,000 8,500 200 61,700
3,700 i,5oo 300 5,5oo
1,000 100 -- 1,200
100 — — 100
70,500 12,800 750 81j,050
Overseas Food Corporation, Report and Accounts for 19^9-1950
(London, 1950), p. 19. The totals differ slightly. This should be ex-
pected because some land was normally left for grass which was included
for rotational purposes. Hereafter cited as Reports 19ii9-1950 .
'Ibid.
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Staff Problems
The year was also characterized by staff problems which not only
affected the staff themselves but delayed the entire operation. The
unit managers were loaded with many duties. The resignations started
with Senior Field Assistants who left the work in the hands of new
inexperienced field staff. At this time the morale was in jeopardy even
among the newly recruited staff. To avoid sudden breakdown, the O.F.C.
did not employ thorough methods of selecting new staff because it had
to do it quickly. In this connection it again found itself burdened
with a relatively large number of unreliable men who in themselves were
another serious obstacle to the development of the Scheme.
A newspaper correspondent who had just returned from Tanganyika
made this statement in London.
Anyone who ha? lived and worked on the Groundnut Scheme
would agree that bewilderment and disillusion are and have been
the prime sentiments shared between all grades. This is the
tragedy. Many good vigorous men saw the writing on the wall
and took themselves off to jobs elsewhere. Almost for certain
they stayed in Africa, for once having experienced life in that
country they were bitten with it. It was not the hardship of
dust storms or the grilling sun that prompted them to move.
3
Transportation
Transportation problems of various kinds have been discussed in
Chapter III. The measures to remedy them have been touched upon, but
this did not eliminate them entirely as they persisted in the later years.
<Anon., "Mo Confidence at Kongwa," The Economist , Vol. CLVII
(November, 19h9), p. 1132. See also The New York Times , October 17,
I9h9.
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In the period 19U9-1950 a deficiency in the total port handling power
was a major limiting factor, both in the United Kingdom and in East
Africa. In London, for example, there was a dock strike which affected
the movement capacity in the East African ports. Consequently, urgent
seasonal requirements were not met, thus preventing planting at the
right time. Rain came at a certain time of the year and if planting
did not take place at that time, it would not take place at all. No
risks would be taken in late planting, which might mean that the crop
would be affected by the subsequent dry season, and hence destroyed.
In the port of Dar-es-Salaam, the rates of clearance and discharge
as planned in the previous year ( 19l 8-19li9 ) were not achieved. This was
due to delays in providing enough facilities, and limitation in meeting
serious labour problems. Taking the first quarter of 19$0 for example,
it was found that the tonnage cleared at the port was half that cleared
in the corresponding period of the last year (19h9).
The Scheme as a Political Issue
As a political issue the Scheme became controversial when it started
failing, especially in 19h9. Alan Wood in writing about it said, "Many
of the mistakes made in the Scheme have been precisely due to the fact
that it has not been run on socialist lines." Two important questions
of principle were involved: first, there was always an assumption that
if things went wrong, all circumstances would fall under public examination,
^Alan Wood, "Socialism by hiblic Corporation," New Statesman and
Nation
,
Vol. XXVII-XXXVI 1 1 (November 5, 19ii9), p. 5o77~ Alan Wood was
one of the employees of the O.F.C. He was a critic of the way the
Scheme was operated.
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debate and decision. This was the advantage of public as opposed to
private enterprise. Second, there was a hope that those people directly
informed would be aware that it was their deep concern to shape the
policy with greater attention than if they were working for a private
business. Neither was achieved by the O.F.C.
In considering the first condition, it was found that the O.F.C.
did not supply enough information to the public who in this respect
were regarded as "shareholders" who provided the money for the Scheme.
For example, in February, 19^7, a white paper (Cmd. 7030) was published
followed in January, 19ij8, by the first "Review of .Progress" (Cmd. 73lli)
relating the story to the end of November, 191*7 . From that time no
other white paper was published until the first annual report of the
O.F.G. came out in 19h9 •> Despite the delay, the report was still out
of date. It also concentrated on errors and miscalculations committed
before the O.F.C. took over the duties and responsibilities. However,
by this time about £ 23 million had already been spent—almost half of
an estimated original cost. More money was needed but already those
(public) responsible for producing the money were complaining of being
insufficiently supplied with information pertaining to the operation of
the Scheme.
^
Furthermore, the Minister of Food, John Strachey, had not given a
white paper providing for a basis for sound parliamentary discussions.
"A costly experiment: a reorganization of the Overseas Food Cor-
poration in London seems essential due to the results of the Groundnuts
Scheme in Tanganyika," The Economist , Vol. CLVII (November 5, 19h9),
p. 989. See also "British Peanut Flan Meets Rising Costs," The New
York Tiroes, January 28, 19)48.
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His speeches came at the conclusion of the only two Parliamentary debates
(Uarch lJU and July 27, l?l9). Alan Wood described them as "long and
cloudy, and unsatisfactory. It was the responsibility of high level
officials to furnish the information to the public instead of letting
(expecting) them to learn about it here and there through the press. Among
the information that leaked through the press was that clearing diffi-
culties had been greater than expected and that growing of groundnuts
on already cleared land had not demonstrated good economic prospects.
However, the public had not been told officially if those things repre-
sented only temporary drawbacks or basic flaws which might endanger the
future of the Scheme.' Furthermore, Strachey's speech on March lii,
had been very misleading when he said "the revenues from the Scheme may
well add up to anything up to twice the original estimates and that it
will be far more profitable than was originally estimated.
Entire blame was directed at Strachey as a public figure who was
charged with the duties of taking care of public interests. There were
two levels at which his failure appeared: first, he did not represent
the public honestly as he should have done as a party politician whose
election to office rested on public votes ; second, he had failed to
check on the operations of the O.F.C. on behalf of the public, and to
<ood, o£. cit
., p. 507. For further information see also "A
Costly Experiment:...", o£. cit
., p. 990, which presents a similar complaint,
7
Wood, loc. cit
.
8
Ibid.
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make clear all the mistakes made and to seek advise on how to have them
corrected. As a result he presented inaccurate information, consequently
placing the whole question of the relation between himself as a minis-
terial chief executive and a public organization in jeopardy.
A second mistake that appeared in the Scheme was the failure to
consider the people in the middle and lower ranks. First, the full
use was not made of the technical knowledge of men who were on the spot.
In other nationalized industries in England there were demands that
workers should be given a place in the control of the industries. They
were the people immediately concerned, and making full use of them would
not only improve their efficiency but their morale also.
With the Scheme (as a nationalized industry) this demand was prac-
tically ignored. The fact that the bulk of the working group of the
Scheme were Africans did not necessarily mean that they could not be
given a larger share in managing its activities. Just as coal miners
were allowed to participate in running coal mines in Britain so that
they would know more about them and improve their efficiency, a similar
opportunity could have been opened to Africans working with the Scheme.
In general, the point was that the Seheme was a nationalized enter-
prise that was supposed to be managed on the democratic socialist prin-
ciples. The practice was already going on in England. There was no
genuine reason why the same principles could not be practiced by the
people in the Scheme.
It is horrifying and depressing to a degree to feel in-
secure in one's own job, not because of taking a venturesome
risk which may not work, but because one is involved in a
bureaucratic organization where mediocre values are acceptable.
General conditions may be bad enough, but the worst drought
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or cloud-burst is less damaging than finding oneself in-
volved in an action which is questionable on grounds of
wisdom, need or rirhtness, purely because a political
question raised 3,000 miles away convinces the authori-
ties, against the advice of the experts on the spot, that
it must be done. Everyone forced into acceding to such a
..ctice or taking part in it looses respect for the source
of such orders, and themselves become muddled in carrying
them out.
^
Investigation revealed that apart from the factors mentioned, lack
of mutual respect among the staff did great harm to the Scheme. Intra-
staff fighting resulting from divergent principles caused some to trans-
fer to other fields where they anticipated working without having to
fight against dictatorial ignorance, emotions, and obstinacy. Efficient
men, employed frequently withdrew because of poor performances from
others, especially those in authority. Little encouragement and in-
centive was given by top officials to the more capable subordinate .
A typical comment seems to have been, "It is a poor show. No amount of
planning, good, bad, or indifferent, can ever come to life without the
yeast of inspiration."
Criticism continued to mount in Britain. It was one of the objec-
tives of the Scheme, if successful, to bring a great deal of social and
economic benefits not only to the people immediately concerned (the
employees) but also to the whole of the territories (tanganyika, Kenya,
and Northern Rhodesia). The health, nutrition, housing, welfare and
labour policies were regarded as integral parts of the project, in that
9
"No Confidence at Kongwa," loc . cit
.
10ibid.
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they aimed at raising the standard of living of people of East Africa.
The O.F.C. was severely criticized for failure in this area. As a
political issue at the time of election, this was expected. The Con-
servatives who were determined to unseat the Labourites, concentrated
on the negative criticisms and overlooked the positive ones. Rerabering
the education, social and medical services, the O.F.C. provided, it
would be difficult to take all these criticisms as constructive.
On November 19, 19h9 9 Winston Churchill, leader of the oppostion
in Parliament, demanded an extensive probe into the project. Meanwhile,
on November 20, two officials of the O.F.C., Wakefield and Rosa, were
dismissed by the government on the grounds that they had demonstrated
poor performance of their duties. Two days later a Parliamentary debate
took place over Churchill's earlier motion regarding inquiry. Strechey,
the Minister for Food, speaking for the government said that an inquiry
would delay the work that was going on. He added that by 195>h only
one-fifth of the estimated acreage could have been cleared and prepared
for planting. The decision to continue, he stressed, was made because
the primary need of relieving Britain and the world from a shortage of
oils and fats had not been met. He also did not believe that the amount
already spent was a waste because railroads, roads, ports and buildings
had been established in required places.
The colonial secretary, Arthur Jones, supporting Strechey said,
"The project has made great contributions to Africa." All these
13
-The New York Times
,
(November 22, 19h9) 9 P. 13. For supporting
information see "Groundnuts on the Rocks," Time Magazine , Vol. LIV
(November II4, 19ii9), p. 3iu
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optimistic statements from government representatives aroused furor
among the opposition members. Although opposition did not demand the
termination of the project, Colonel Oliver Stanley, their spokesman
said, "The country's confidence in the enterprise has been shaken and
that an inquiry was demanded." The motion was lost by 315 to l6l
votes.
The Events of 1950-1951
After 1950 the plans were that no further clearing could take place
anywhere else except Lindi in the Southern Province. The former target
was to have some 100,000 acres cleared by 195l and 600,000 by 1951. The
Lindi area according to surveys, had good soil and a sufficient amount
of rainfall. Unfortunately, these plans did not materialize at the
right time because transportation was still a crucial problem. Never-
the le°s, the government continued to give frequent announcements of
revisions in the scope and even content of the enterprise. This created
further political outburst, and a series of parliamentary debates fostered
by the Conservatives. In the first debate, on July 18, 1950, they de-
manded that the government cut down the appropriation for continuing the
project. The Conservatives were fully supported by the Liberals and
almost unseated the Labour government. During the debate Maurice Webb,
the new Minister for Food, frankly told the House that the project had
shown many shortcomings and even admitted that it had been in the past
very disappointing. He moved that the Scheme be recast on a long-term
12 The New York Times
, loc . cit .
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basis. He added that the emphasis would eventually not be so much on the
growing of nuts to produce fats, but more on a broad plan of colonial
development. In addition, the O.F.G. was attacked for overlooking the
objectives of the Colonial Development Act of 19l}8. The votes were
299 to 290 for the government. 1^
Concurrently, a committee was appointed to investigate and make
recommendations to the government based on its findings. An initial
recommendation was submitted on September 29, 1950. Its essence was to
reduce the project in Kongwa region by five-six. It was based on the
fact that there had been a loss of £ l,hOO,000 in crop in that region.
It suggested that "cropping of 7^4,000 acres of tract be trimmed next
year (1951) to about 12,000 acres. ,fl5 The remainder, the committee
continued to recommend, should be turned into pasture. The Board of the
O.F.C. accepted these suggestions and even helped to foster the new idea
also conceived by the committee that the future crops be limited to only
groundnuts, sorghum and maize (corn), and crops like sunflower and saf-
flower which had proved total failures, be eliminated completely.
In November of the same year it was reported that the Corporation
had recorded £ 3,551,111 loss in its books. This meant the progress
during the previous year (19h9) had been nil. Even the cost of harvesting
^For the objectives of the Colonial Development Act of 19^3, see
Chapter I under O.F.G.
^The New York Times , July 19, 1950.
^The New York Times , September 30, 1950.
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in that year was found to be greater than the value of crop. ° The year
1950 ended with a narrow chance for the Labour government to insist on
furthering the Scheme. But by January, 1951, the Labour government had
no alternative than to accept the fact that its attempt to grow ground-
nuts on large-scale basis in East Africa had practically proved to be
an expensive fiasco. A white paper was issued stating the abandonment
of all plans. It was recommended, however, that the program be con-
tinued as a pilot project and that the responsibility of running it
be transferred from the O.F.C. to the Secretary of State for the
colonies. '
Conclusion
The Labourites won in the 19h5 election not because the conserva-
tives under Churchill's leadership had proven incapable, but the people
simply preferred another leader for peace. (Churchill was a war leader.)
The Labour government with Clement R. Attlee as rrime Minister wanted to
reconstruct British economy. Being a Socialist government it embarked
on Socialist programs,—Nationalization of major industries—Bank of
England, the coal industries, civil aviation, telecommunications
—
just
to name a few took the lead. Others included National Insurance Act of
1916, Health Service Act of 19h6 and the repeal of the Trades Union and
Disputes Act of 1927. All these measures dominated 3ritish politics
from 19U5 to 19^1.
i^The New York Tijnes, November, 19^0.
"Th
entirely.
17
'This action eliminated the O.F.C. activities with the Scheme
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But more controversial was the rapid independence given to
colonies and programs that were started in some of them by the Labour
Government. To run these programs, a loan of $3,750,000,000 was obtained
from the United States. This aroused much opposition in the 195>0 elec-
tion in which the Labourites won a bare majority in the House of Com-
mons. In l°£l the situation was climaxed by the failure and the abandon-
ment of the Groundnut Scheme because it had failed to produce the expected
results. All these chain of issues led to the fall of the Labour Govern-
ment in 19E>1, hence, politically, 19k9-195>l was really a crucial period
for the Labourites. A bill was introduced in the House of Commons to
write off the £ 36,000,000 that had been spent as the burial of Britain's
Groundnut Scheme in East Africa.
CHAtTKR VIII
EVALUATION
Now that the Groundnut Scheme was buried, what next? The attempt
had not produced the expected results owing to the difficulties whose
seriousness at the beginning was due to lack of pilot experiments.
After it had been started, many problems were confronted which were
quite extraordinary to a large-scale, mechanized agricultural project
of this tyoe under unfamiliar and hostile tropical conditions. Not only
was it difficult with the machinery available to prepare the wild forests,
but also, it was apparent that the inhospitable climatic and soil con-
ditions were not conducive to yields set up in the plan. Other compli-
cations appeared. They included getting trained men and housing them
adequately, getting rid of and improving the poor transportation facil-
ities, and solving technical problems.
The reductions in the scope of the Scheme for 19hQ-19k9 did not
help at all. The difficulties were so great that they could not be
overcome in the time set. The disappointing results and pessimistic
attitude of both the Conservatives and the public in Britain opened a
way for severe criticism; nevertheless, the history of the Scheme proves
that the criticism was well taken. This criticism was voiced both in
the press and in the Parliament. Finally, the government, having no
other course, accepted abandonment of the Scheme and substituted the
experimental project in tropical agriculture. An experimental project
should have been a first consideration and not an afterthought. While
the Scheme itself may have been a disappointment and a fiasco, the
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experience obtained from it can be regarded as useful in formulating
other plans for agricultural programs in underdeveloped countries,
particularly those of Tropical Africa.
Furthermore, one can look at the failure of the Scheme from a dif-
ferent angle. The Conservatives attacked the Scheme as an example of
Socialist practice. They included in their arguments that the farms
should have been broken down into small privately-owned units so as to
instill in the people a profit motive and a fear of personal loss which
would induce them to work harder.-*- The amount of work done indicated
that the men who worked with the Scheme were as enthusiastic and devoted
as any group of pioneers who ventured to open up a wild land for their
own personal benefits. The group could not be expected to succeed right
away without experiencing some failures. The employees of the Groundnut
Scheme worked tirelessly under severe weather conditions and bad leader-
ship. James Csmeron, writing in April, 19U8, said:
This would be a formidable enough tropical adventure
in any case, thus Groundnut Scheme, without having to
dream up trucks where no trucks are, to force work out
of tractors that have rotted away on Philippine beaches,
to improvise something out of jeeps that actually arrive
with the big-ends gone
. . .
Ever so often some snarling malcontent goes home,
determined to ventilate his frustrations and expose the
plan's inadequacies.
The 19^0 election, no party received a mandate and no strong
government was possible. Another election was predicted to take place
very soon. The Conservatives, therefore, thought of many reasons to
prove to the public that the Labour Socialist programs had failed.
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But most remain, very ordinary, decent bodies from
workshops and offices and grocer
a
1 counters, growling
at the obstinacy of this endless Africa, eating their
paludrina pills, wanting their wives, mending and mak-
ing do, and doing it well £
Cameron went on to comment, "The extraordinary fact that the^e grousers
are at the same time doing a good job well, enthusiastic, cooperative,
shoving their backs into the thing for no other reason I can except that
they believe in it."-'
Moreover, Britain, in undertaking the groundnut project, was not
the only European nation which turned to public corporation as a major
instrument for developing African virgin lands. France was also engaged
in a similar ambitious undertaking aimed at relieving Europe from shortage
of oils and fats. A good example of the French project was in French
Senegal** in ;est Africa at Kaffrine. The French government was engaged
in developing groundnuts production with the help of intensive farming
methods and mechanical means. One can easily observe similar problems
encountered by the French.
2R. G. Tugwell, "Groundnut and Liberty," Common Cause
,
(January 1951),
p. 3lJU . James Cameron was one of the commentators on the operations of
the Scheme. He wrote these words in April, 19^3. Tugwell followed the
operations of the Groundnut Scheme very closely and wrote about it for
Common Cause especially in 19!?0. He was in East Africa himself, which
he left in May, 19h9, Tugwell, in his issue of April, 19H?0, was trying
to defend the socialist ideal which was severely attacked by the Con-
servatives. He was professor of Political Science at London School of
Economics, 19^9 to 195>0. It follows that it was during this period when
he visited East Africa, and it also means that he did not stay there for
a long time. As a political scientist, he wrote about the Groundnut Scheme
at the time it «• a major political issue. He was an American himself
and he wrote the article for interested Americans.
3 Ibid
.
French Senegal was a French colony in West Africa. Today it is an
independent country called "Senegal."
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The administrative part of the project was too large. The execu-
tive officers were not willing to divide job responsibilities. Ef-
ficiency was sacrificed for speed. A comparable situation had also
developed in relationship to the Scheme, The Scheme failed insofar as
it was part of the colonial development program. For instance, the Scheme
can be linked to the familiar propaganda that the Empire was a treasure
house with resources needing capital investment to bring returns within
a reasonable period $ but nobody would kno?<r precisely whether the outcome
was going to be positive or negative. However, the investors went ahead
to widen British policy and economy. The white conservatives in Kenya
who started by severely criticizing the Scheme as a Socialist experiment,
ended by praising it for strengthening British influence against the
communist infiltration.
African Reaction to the Scheme
The Scheme was introduced in 19U6, half a century after the coming
of Europeans in East Africa. By this time some young Africans had been
educated and had developed a taste for western civilization. They had
reached a stage where they were anxious to imitate many European actions.
With this in mind, they reacted more favourably to the Scheme than their
elders. They accepted employment with the Scheme, earned money and bought
clothing for themselves and their families, bought shoes that they had
never worn before and some other modern things like bicycles which enabled
them to move from place to place with ease. On the basis of this, they
thought the Scheme was good for the country.
13$
-*uite different was the relationship between the African workers
and the English employers. Some of them had never had personal confron-
tation with a white man. The Scheme made this possible and allowed him
to evaluate the Englishman. The English naturally appeared to them as
impatient—they wanted to get things done in a hurry, which was un-
natural to the Africans. The Englishmen shouted orders and displayed
quick tempers. The Africans thought these were signs of illbreeding.
On the other hand, they were very much impressed with the willingness
of the Englishmen to do manual work with them—something which they
thought Englishmen never did. They had formed their impression from
government officers and company managers who had developed a practice
of having manual work done by the Africans while they performed super-
visory tasks. The Africans also became critical of some Englishmen who
made no attempt to learn Swahili, and relied on interpreters whose ef-
ficiency was doubted, and thus dangerous to proper understanding and
performance. It was also dangerous to the workers in the sense that
they would bear the blame for failure to understand the orders.
It can be pointed out that the Englishman failed to realize the
fact that sound means of communication which should have been achieved
through their mastery of S.ahili language, was the key for making
Africans understand the broader objective of the Scheme.
It is claimed that the Scheme will produce a revolution
in African Agriculture by replacing the hoe with a tractor.
But, as an educated African put it: "How does that help me?
I cannot afford to buy a tractor and, even if I had one, I could
not afford to maintain it. I must either
r
,ive up farming al-
together or else stick to my hoe.* Unless we are to say that
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agriculture in Africa is a job for only the skilled, he
is right.
5
"These strangers have organized a dance in our village" one
teacher said, "and it is a good dance, but they ought first to have
asked the permission of the village elders, according to our custom. "°
Such remarks were a sign of prejudice against change. It also
proved that the conservative element was predominant among the elders.
They had other complaints too. They complained of a breakdown in family
life. loung men left their homes and were not heard of for many days.
"It is worse than war when every man had at least a number."' Worse
still was the spread of prostitution. Before the coming of the Europeans,
prostitution did not exist in most African communities. The Englishmen
working with the Scheme introduced it and in doing so only strengthened
the conservative element among the Africans. Finally, there were
further complaints. Tilling of the native small farms was a heavy burden
for the women and the old men who were left to do this at home for an
indefinite period. Among the African wage earners in general, there
was a complaint that the influx of Europeans was causing a rise in the
cost of living. The Africans were unable to cope with such drastic and
rapid change,
8
^Bishop of Masasi, "African Reactions to the Groundnut Scheme,"
Commonwealth and Empire Review , April, 19h9 9 p. 58. Masasi diocese
included the Southern Province of Tanganyika in which the largest
groundnut area was situated.
6
Ibid
.
7Ibid
.
8Ibid.
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Looking at it from the positive side, the Scheme should not bear
the entire blame for tribal and family breakdown. This had started
fifty years b: fore; the Scheme merely speeded it up.
African life was always based on local loyalties; each village,
clan or tribe being a close-knit unit with a strong social and moral
consciousness. The bosses were village chiefs and the elders. The
change had comej the young men were going out to work in areas beyond
the chief's control. They came back with money and new ideas which
caused them to resist the orders of the chiefs. This certainly was the
first stage of a gradual transition of power from the traditional chiefs
to young men with new ideas. At the same time, the community sense of
the village was passing away.°
The history of East Africa reveals that this transfer of power
is now complete. The traditional chief is gone. The word "chief"
is not even used in many parts of East Africa because, historically,
it refers to a primitive way of establishing authority. This is be-
cause the young men who are now in power have a different approach.
They are struggling to take from tradition what they think is good and
combine it with what they think is good in the new. The Scheme has not
only been of historical significance in East Africa, but has been of
economic and cultural significance in this transitional period from a
traditional to an industrialized society.
9Ibid.
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Conclusion
The collapse of the Scheme raises one important question. Many
acres of virgin forests had been cleared and planted with crops. Medi-
cal, educational, and recreational facilities had "been established. The
doctors, nurses and workers were trained to serve the Scheme. Transpor-
tation systems had been added to the entire East African System. "'What
happened to these establishments?"
For Britain, it was a big lossj for East Africa, it was a gain.
The land that had been cleared was not left to grow back into brush.
It was turned over to the Tanganyika government which used part of it
for experimental purposes. The rest was given to interested Africans
to farm. The medical, educational and recreational facilities were
also handed over to the Tanganyika government to serve the African
people who decided to settle in the areas. As the history of East
Africa and Africa as a whole indicates, there has been and there is
still a shortage of trained personnel. Some of the doctors and nurses
of the O.F.C. left for England ; others joined medical departments of
Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. This was a contribution to the trained
staff of these governments. The trained African workers also joined
the civil service or private corporation. The transportation services
became a part of the East African transportation system. Other facilities-
educational, recreational, and offices—were left to the Tanganyika
government to utilize in the way it considered fit. The transference
was carried on in accordance with provisions laid down in the O.F.C.
"Tanganyika Ordinance" of 19!?li.
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British Groundnuts Scheme in East Africa ; Labour Government's
Dilemma 19h&-195X examines the development of the Groundnut (peanut)
Scheme in certain East African areas and its effects on the Labour
Government in England. The thesis is as follows: While the future of
the Groundnut Scheme contributed to the collapse of the Labour Govern-
ment in 195>1> the Scheme brought about certain long range benefits for
East Africa.
Although the Groundnut Scheme was a post World War II development,
it was based on a continuation of British Colonial policy throughout
the twentieth century. Preceding programs and policies had been defined
in "Development and Welfare in the Empire" in 1921 and extended in a
series of Colonial Development Acts in 1929* 19k0, 19li5» and 19ii8. The
I9I48 Act established the Overseas Food Corporation which was solely
responsible for the operation of the Scheme. The Scheme itself was a
"project designed to grow rapidly the large-seale, mechanized production
of groundnuts (peanuts) in East and Central Africa."
The reasons for starting the Scheme were economic, social, political
as well as climatic. Economically, Great Britain wanted to improve her
situation as well as that of East Africa. For herself, she aimed at
selling the surplus to needy countries whereas for East Africa, she aimed
at revolutionalizing African agriculture and provide employment to the
African people. Socially, she wanted to raise the welfare of her own
people by recovering from the scarcity of oils and fats which was a
result of the war, and to improve that of the African people through
educational, medical and social welfare programs. Politically, the
Labour Government approved the enterprise as a part of its entire or
2extensive social programs which started when it took office late i.n 19^5.
Climatically, East Africa had been found to be suitable.
The idea was conceived by Frank Samuel, Managing Director of the
United Africa Company. He presented the idea to the Minister of Food,
John Strachey, who informed the House of Commons about it. The Government
thought it was a sound idea and authorized an investigation. The latter
was undertaken by A. J. Wakefield and a team of three in 19U6, The group
submitted a comprehensive report which was printed in the "White Paper"
entitled A flan for the Mechanized Production of Groundnuts in East and
Central Africa . Meanwhile, the Government authorized the United Africa
Company to carry on preliminary preparations until a government agency
was formed to take over the responsibilities.
Prior to the formation of the O.F.C. in 19^3, it was found that
there were miscalculations in the original plan, most of which led to
the impracticability of the plan and consequently slow progress through-
out 19^7. Problems realized were related to transportation, technical
aspects, financial and manpower. An effort was to be made to review
all transportation facilities—railways, airways, roads, and shipping.
Regarding technical aspects, studies were carried on in vegetation,
clearing, rooting and stumping, finding out soil types and their fer-
tility, crop research to find out which crops would possibly grow in the
selected regions—Kongwa, Urambo, and Southern rrovine—was carried on;
protection of the crops from various diseases and pests was also examined.
In 19li3, the O.F.C. after assuming direction of the Scheme developed
a new plan for the purpose of reducing the original plan to a smaller
workable size. Number of acres to be cleared and planted were reduced,
3new financial estimates were drawn up, and reorganization of staff were
all revised.
Apart from the problems facing the O.F.C, to make the Scheme a
productive one, there were problems relating to employees. One of the
objectives of the Scheme was to provide opportunities for social and
economic advancement for Africans, and Europeans living in the selected
areas. To this end, the O.F.C. csred for the educational, medical, and
social opportunities for its employees.
The year 19h9-195o can be looked at as a period of controversy.
The Scheme was now in its fifth year and even under the revised plan,
no constructive results had been achieved. It was a disappointing year
resulting from improper functioning of the new plan. Natural factors
like famine contributed to the failure. Failure, apparent in 195>0,
became one of the political issues that dominated the campaigns of
195>0 and 193>1 in Britain contributing to the fall of Clement Atlee's
Government in 19!?1.
Regarding the Africans, some especially the young, reacted favorably
to the Scheme, others, particularly the old, reacted negatively. The
educated youth thought that it was a contribution to the development
of East Africa. They evaluated it in terms of its agricultural contri-
butions, moneywise, educational, medical, and social developments. The
conservative old on the other hand viewed it as one of the factors that
led to the destruction of their tradition.
